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  INTRODUCTION   
Twenty-one percent of adults in the United States—more 
than sixty-five million Americans—have at least one tattoo.1 
For those under age forty, that percentage nearly doubles.2 Not 
surprisingly, the tattoo business is booming. By some esti-
mates, the U.S. tattoo industry generates $2.3 billion in annual 
revenue.3 Once the mark of sailors, convicts, and circus per-
formers, the tattoo has infiltrated mainstream society.4
Despite its countercultural origins, the tattoo industry 
shares much in common with other, more familiar creative in-
dustries.
 
5 Fundamentally, it capitalizes on market demand for 
original creative works.6 Yet as public goods, the value of those 
works is readily appropriable through copying.7 Predictably, 
copying is both a practical reality and a source of concern with-
in the industry.8
 
 1. See One in Five U.S. Adults Now Has a Tattoo, HARRIS INTERACTIVE 
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris%20Poll%2022% 
20-Tattoos_2.23.12.pdf.  
 But unlike their counterparts in most other 
creative industries, tattooers nearly uniformly reject formal le-
gal mechanisms for adjudicating claims over ownership and 
 2. See Tattooed Gen Nexters, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & 
THE PRESS (Dec. 9, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/daily-number/tattooed-gen 
-nexters (noting that 36% of adults between eighteen and twenty-five and 40% 
of those between twenty-six and forty currently have, or previously had, a tat-
too). 
 3. Max Chafkin, King Ink, INC. (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.inc.com/ 
magazine/20071101/king-ink.html. This estimate, based on 2007 data, likely 
significantly underestimates current industry revenue. 
 4. In its modern form, “a tattoo is created by injecting ink into a person’s 
skin. To do this, an electrically powered tattoo machine, often called a gun, 
moves a solid needle up and down to puncture the skin between 50 and 3,000 
times per minute. The needle penetrates the skin by about a millimeter and 
deposits a drop of insoluble ink into the skin . . . .” Anderson v. City of Hermo-
sa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 5. Cf. Ivan Quintanilla, Tattoos Through Time: A New Museum for Am-
sterdam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, 6:00 AM, http://www.intransit.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/tattoos-through-time-a-new-museum-for-amsterdam/ 
(discussing an Amsterdam museum opening dedicated exclusively to tattoo 
art). 
 6. See generally David Cummings, Creative Expression and the Human 
Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 279 (2013) (arguing that tattooers’ work is capable of satisfying the 
statutory requirements for copyrightability). 
 7. Id. at 307.  
 8. See Interview with Subject 2, Compiled Transcripts with Anonymous 
Tattooers at 19 (May 5–June 1, 2012) (on file with author). 
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copying.9 Although tattoos fall squarely within the protections 
of the Copyright Act, copyright law plays virtually no part in 
the day-to-day operation of the tattoo industry.10 Instead, 
tattooers rely on a set of informal social norms to structure cre-
ative production and mediate relationships within their indus-
try.11
Following in the tradition of earlier scholarship exploring 
the intersection of intellectual property law and social norms,
 
12
But this Article differs from much of the prior work on in-
tellectual property and social norms in two ways. First, the tat-
too industry norms reported here represent the first example of 
market-driven informal alternatives to intellectual property 
law that emerged despite fully applicable formal protections. 
Unlike norms that emerge in the shadow of some barrier to 
meaningful intellectual property protection,
 
this Article sets out with three objectives: to provide a descrip-
tive account of the norms related to creative production within 
the tattoo industry; to explain both the industry’s choice to 
forego formal assertions of legal rights and the particular con-
tent of the norms it has embraced; and to consider the implica-
tions of this case study for intellectual property law and policy 
more generally.  
13
 
 9. Practitioners in the tattoo industry refer to themselves by a number of 
terms, including “tattooists,” “tattoo artists,” and “tattooers.” See Interview 
with Subject 1, supra note 
 tattoo industry 
norms function as an informal system of community govern-
8, at 16; id. with Subject 13 at 144. While these 
terms sometimes reflect subtle shades of meaning, I will refer to them as 
“tattooers,” the term most commonly used by my interview subjects. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1643, 1661 (1996) (explaining that norms exist when members of a group 
are obligated to do something under certain conditions or face some sanction). 
 12. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property 
Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012); 
Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property 
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCIENCE 187 (2008); Jacob Loshin, 
Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property without Law, in 
LAW & MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010); 
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up 
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008).  
 13. See Loshin, supra note 12, at 125–30; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra 
note 12, at 187–91; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1799–1805; see also 
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 317, 322–25 (2011). 
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ance that developed despite an applicable body of formal law.14 
And unlike norms governing nonmarket behavior, tattoo indus-
try norms prevail despite the same profit motive characteristic 
of many creative fields.15
Second, tattoo industry norms are unique because they 
must account for a more complex set of relationships than those 
observed in earlier case studies. Tattooers must establish 
norms that govern not only their interactions with each other, 
but with clients who play an important role in the creation and 
use of their works as well.
  
16 Further complicating matters, 
aside from copying within their industry, tattooers are faced 
with the question of the propriety of copying outside of it.17 This 
overlapping complex of relationships between tattooers, clients, 
and the broader art world yields a correspondingly rich, nu-
anced, and perhaps contradictory set of creative norms.18
Part I of this Article offers a brief history of the practice of 
tattooing—beginning with its widespread use in early civiliza-
tions, then turning to its colonial reincorporation into the West, 
and the recent emergence of the “tattoo renaissance.”
 
19
After establishing the doctrinal applicability and practical 
irrelevance of formal copyright law to tattoos, Part II catalogs 
the norms that structure the tattoo industry. To develop this 
descriptive account, I conducted fourteen in-person qualitative 
interviews in early 2012 with tattooers throughout the United 
 This 
Part will also introduce the basic structure and vocabulary of 
the contemporary tattoo industry. 
 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. David Fagundes, for example, has described the norms governing roll-
er derby pseudonyms. See Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1108–31. Because such 
noms de guerre are registerable as service marks, those norms serve as an al-
ternative to, rather than a substitute for, formal law. Id. at 1114–15. But they 
emerge in large part because of the non-market volunteerism that defines the 
roller derby community. Id. at 1140–43. 
 16. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 19. 
 17. Others have described norms that distinguish between obligations 
owed to those within a community and obligations owed to those outside of it. 
See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Cre-
ativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 156 (2007) (discussing norms within 
fan communities). 
 18. See Tattoos Conquer Modern Art as Needles and Ink Replace Brushes, 
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/ 
23/tattoo-artists-new-york (discussing the “intimate client relationships” 
maintained by tattooers and the tattoo industry’s “fractured” interaction with 
the modern art world). 
 19. See generally Arnold Rubin, The Tattoo Renaissance, in MARKS OF 
CIVILIZATION 233 (Arnold Rubin ed., 1988). 
  
2013] TATTOO NORMS 515 
 
States, identified through snowball sampling relying on exist-
ing industry contacts.20 In terms of geography, gender, experi-
ence level, work environment, style, and clientele, these inter-
views capture a diverse, if not necessarily representative, cross 
section of perspectives within the tattoo community.21
These interviews revealed five core norms. First, tattooers 
as a rule recognize the autonomy interests of their clients both 
in the design of custom tattoos and their subsequent display 
and use. Second, tattooers collectively refrain from reusing cus-
tom designs—that is, a tattooer who designs an image for a cli-
ent will not apply that same image on another client. Third, 
tattooers discourage the copying of custom designs—that is, a 
tattooer generally will not apply another tattooer’s custom im-
ages to a willing client. Fourth, tattooers create and use pre-
designed tattoo imagery, or “flash,” with the understanding 
that it will be freely reproduced. Finally, tattooers generally 
embrace the copying of works that originate outside of the tat-
too industry, such as paintings, photos, or illustrations. In some 
ways, these norms unintentionally echo familiar concepts from 
copyright law, but they differ from formal law in important re-
spects as well. 
 
Part III offers a number of complementary explanations for 
the content of tattoo industry norms and the industry’s reliance 
upon them. Both the culture and economics of the tattoo indus-
try gave rise to its particular set of norms. Tattooers share a 
disdain for authority and a history of harsh legal regulation 
that renders them generally hostile to the legal system. Per-
haps more importantly, as a deeply client-driven enterprise, 
the tattoo industry is sensitive to consumer expectations. Those 
expectations provide strong incentives for the development of 
norms in order to preserve the industry’s collective interest in 
the continued viability of the market for custom tattoos. Final-
ly, tattoo norms also erect barriers to entry to the increasingly 
crowded field of tattooers, revealing the guild-like nature of the 
industry.  
Part IV concludes by considering the broader lessons the 
tattoo industry offers for intellectual property law and policy. 
The tattoo industry’s success reveals the importance of custom-
 
 20. Snowball sampling is a “nonrandom sampling technique . . . in which 
survey subjects are selected based on referral from other survey respondents.” 
KEN BLACK, BUSINESS STATISTICS FOR CONTEMPORARY DECISION MAKING 230 
(4th ed. 2004). 
 21. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 1. 
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izing creative goods to deter widespread copying and of bun-
dling easily copied creative goods with difficult-to-copy personal 
services. 
I.  A HISTORY OF TATTOOS   
The term “tattoo” entered the English language through 
Captain James Cook’s accounts of his travels in Polynesia.22
Both sexes paint their Bodys, Tattow, as it is called in their Lan-
guage. This is done by inlaying the Colour of Black under their skins, 
in such a manner as to be indelible . . . . The colour they use is lamp 
black, prepar’d from the Smoak of a Kind of Oily nut, used by them 
instead of Candles. The instrument for pricking it under the Skin is 
made of very thin flatt pieces of bone or Shell . . . . One end is cut into 
sharp teeth, and the other fastened to a handle. The teeth are dipped 
into black Liquor, and then drove, by quick sharp blows struck upon 
the handle with a Stick . . . .
 In 
1769, Cook witnessed Tahitians engaged in the practice of 
“tattowing” and described it as follows: 
23




This Part briefly traces the five-thousand-year history of 
tattooing, from evidence of its use in pre-historic societies to the 
contemporary, technology-mediated tattoo industry. This his-
torical grounding, particularly the dramatic shift in American 
tattooing over the last five decades, is central to understanding 
the attitudes and norms surrounding copying within the indus-
try today. 
 But tattooing developed in cultures across the 
globe long before the European public became fascinated with 
Cook’s adventures. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF TATTOOING 
In 1991, climbers in the Italian Alps stumbled upon the 
frozen corpse of the Tyrolean Iceman, a 5300-year-old mummy 
adorned with fifty-seven simple geometric tattoos made from a 
pigment derived from soot.25
 
 22. C.P. Jones, Stigma and Tattoo, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 1 (Jane 
Caplan ed., 2000). 
 The Iceman was not alone among 
 23. WILLIAM J. L. WHARTON, CAPTAIN COOK’S JOURNAL DURING HIS FIRST 
VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD MADE IN H.M. BARK ‘ENDEAVOUR,’ 1768–71: A 
LITERAL TRANSCRIPTION OF THE ORIGINAL MSS. WITH NOTES AND INTRODUC-
TION 93 (1893). 
 24. Jones, supra note 22, at 1.  
 25. Maria Anna Pabst et al., The Tattoos of the Tyrolean Iceman: A Light 
Microscopical, Ultrastructural and Element Analytical Study, 36 J. ARCHAEOL. 
SCI. 2335, 2335 (2009); Jennifer Viegas, Oetzi Iceman’s Tattoos Came from 
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pre-historic tattoo collectors. Egyptian mummies dating back to 
2100 B.C. were tattooed with a “‘dark, blackish-blue pigment 
applied with a pricking instrument, perhaps consisting of one 
or more fish bones set into a wooden handle.’”26 A Scythian 
mummy from 500 B.C. bore elaborate depictions of animals on 
the arms and back.27 And a thousand-year-old Peruvian mum-
my featured “ornamental tattoos depicting stylised apes, birds, 
and reptiles on the forearms, hands, and lower legs.”28
Tattooing was practiced throughout the ancient world. In 
Japan, the evidence dates to at least the third century B.C.
 
29 
The admonition in Leviticus—“[n]ever mark your skin with tat-
toos”—suggests the practice was known among the Israelites.30 
The Persians passed tattooing on to the Greeks, who used the 
term “stigmata” to describe images “inscribed on the face or 
some other part of the body . . . by pricking the places with 
needles, wiping away the blood, and rubbing it in . . . the [ink] 
preparation.”31 The Greeks, in turn, passed the practice on to 
the Romans.32
The social meanings of these early tattoos were as diverse 
as the cultures that created them. Some tattoos were purely 
ornamental.
 
33 Others had ceremonial or religious functions.34 
Still others are thought to have served therapeutic purposes.35 
Some indicated high rank or social status,36
 
Fireplace, DISCOVERY NEWS (July 17, 2009, 12:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews 
.com/id/31965532/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/oetzi-iceman-tatoos 
-came-fireplace/#.UjjhvaXujnp. 
 whereas Greek and 
 26. Jones, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting Richard S. Bianchi, Tätowierung, 
in LEXICON DER ÄGYPTOLOGIE 145–46 (W. Helck & E. Otto, VI ed., 1986)). 
 27. See Pabst, supra note 25, at 2337.   
 28. Leopold Dorfer et al., A Medical Report from the Stone Age?, 354 LAN-
CET 1023, 1023 (1999). 
 29. See MARGO DEMELLO, BODIES OF INSCRIPTION: A CULTURAL HISTORY 
OF THE MODERN TATTOO COMMUNITY 72 (2000); DONALD RICHIE & IAN 
BURUMA, THE JAPANESE TATTOO 11 (1980). 
 30. LEVITICUS 28:19 (New Living Translation). 
 31. Jones, supra note 22, at 4–5 (quoting AETIUS AMIDENUS, 
TETRABIBLON 8, 12; Alessandro Olivieri, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum VIII/2 
(Berlin, 1950), pp. 417–18). 
 32. Jones, supra note 22, at 4–11. 
 33. Dorfer et al., supra note 28, at 1023. 
 34. See Juliet Fleming, The Renaissance Tattoo, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 
68–70 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000); Jones, supra note 22, at 13 (noting that tattoos 
were often part of Christian pilgrimages to the Holy Land). 
 35. See Dorfer et al., supra note 28, at 1023 (noting the close correspond-
ence between tattoos on mummified remains and acupuncture points). 
 36. See WILFRID DYSON HAMBLY, THE HISTORY OF TATTOOING 206–07 
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Roman “stigma” were reserved for prisoners and slaves.37
B. COLONIALISM & TATTOOS IN THE WEST 
 Over 
the centuries that followed, tattoos continued to serve many of 
these same functions. 
Tattooing was practiced in the British Isles long before 
Cook’s excursions to Polynesia. The Picts, the pre-Roman in-
habitants of modern-day Scotland, “receive[d] their name from 
their painted . . . bodies, because they are marked by tattoos of 
various figures made with iron pricks and black pigment.”38 
And in the early seventeenth century, Native Americans re-
exposed the British to tattooing.39 Europeans of this period en-
countered tattoos in Africa and Asia as well, apparently “with-
out being tempted to try it for themselves.”40
That changed when Cook returned to Europe after his se-
cond circumnavigation, bearing not only accounts of Polynesian 
tattooing but a living example of it. Omai, a tattooed native of 
the island of Raiatea, arrived in England in 1774 onboard one 
of Cook’s ships.
 
41 Omai became something of a sensation; 
“newspapers printed his life story, the most celebrated artists 
painted his portrait, the popular theatre made him into a hero 
and a box-office hit, and learned men counted it an honor to 
shake his hand . . . .”42 More importantly, he “sparked a tattoo-
ing vogue among the English aristocracy.”43
 
(2009) (noting the “status-giving” function of tattoos in Polynesian cultures). 
 
 37. Jones, supra note 22, at 5. 
 38. SAINT ISIDORE (OF SEVILLE), THE ETYMOLOGIES OF ISIDORE OF 
SEVILLE 198 (Stephen A. Barney et al. trans., 2006); see also JOHN SPEED, THE 
HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAINE 167 (1611) (“The Britaines . . . by means of artifi-
cial incisions of sundry formes have from their childhood divers shapes of 
beasts incorporate upon them; and having their markes deeply imprinted 
within their bodies . . . .”). 
 39. SAMUEL PURCHAS, PURCHAS HIS PILGRIMAGE 955 (1617) (describing 
Algonquian women who would “pounce and raze their bodies, leggs, thighes, 
and armes, in curious knots and pourtraytures of fowles, fishes, beasts and 
rub a painting into the same, which will never will out.”); see also Fleming, su-
pra note 34, at 69 (noting that “pouncing” and “razing” were English terms for 
tattooing used until the mid-eighteenth century).  
 40. Id. at 67. 
 41. Harriet Guest, Curiously Marked: Tattooing and Gender Differences in 
Eighteenth-Century British Perceptions of the South Pacific, in WRITTEN ON 
THE BODY 83 (Jane Caplan ed. 2000). 
 42. Stephan Oettermann, On Display: Tattooed Entertainers in America 
and Germany, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 196 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000). 
 43. Fleming, supra note 34, at 67. 
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Initially, the European tattooed class comprised primarily 
sailors, soldiers, and adventurers who traveled to Tahiti, New 
Zealand, and other far-flung locales.44 Cook’s own crewmembers 
were among the first Europeans to return with traditional Pol-
ynesian tattoos.45 And tattooing quickly spread throughout the 
British military.46
By the nineteenth century, European fashionable society 
was “gripped by a tattoo craze.”
 
47 Sutherland Macdonald and 
Ted Riley opened tattoo studios where wealthy Londoners ea-
gerly joined the newly tattooed upper class with the likes of 
Queen Olga of Greece, the Duke of York, Lady Randolph 
Churchill, and King Oscar II of Sweden.48
In the United States, Martin Hildebrandt opened the first 
professional tattoo shop in 1846 in New York.
 
49 Early U.S. 
tattooers like Hildebrandt and Gus Wagner relied on the same 
basic techniques and hand tools used for thousands of years.50
 
 44. DEMELLO, supra note 
 
But in 1891, another New York tattooer, Samuel O’Reilly, in-
vented the tattoo machine, a device that fundamentally re-
29, at 49. 
 45. Id. at 45; Harriet Guest, Curiously Marked: Tattooing, Masculinity, 
and Nationality in Eighteenth Century British Perceptions of the South Pacific, 
in PAINTING AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE: NEW ESSAYS ON BRITISH ART 
1700–1850, at 130–31 (John Barrell ed., 1992) (describing the “inauguration of 
the nautical tradition” of tattooing in the eighteenth century). 
 46. For example, Lord Roberts, who was tattooed during his military ser-
vice in Burma, encouraged tattoos among his officers. James Bradley, Body 
Commodification? Class and Tattoos in Victorian Britain, in WRITTEN ON THE 
BODY 145 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000). 
 47. Id. at 145–46. 
 48. Id. Of course, tattoos were not found exclusively among members of 
high society. During this period, relatively crude and inexpensive tattoos could 
be found among “sailors, dockers, and other rough diamonds”—as well as 
criminals and convicts—throughout Europe. Id. at 141 (quoting GEORGE 
BURCHETT, MEMOIRS OF A TATTOOIST 13,139 (1958)); see also Jane Caplan, 
National Tattooing, Traditions of Tattooing in Nineteenth-Century Europe, in 
WRITTEN ON THE BODY 156–57 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000) (discussing tattoos 
among German and Italian criminals); Hamish Maxwell Stewart & Ian Duf-
field, Skin Deep Devotions: Religious Tattoos and Convict Transportation to 
Australia, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 118 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000); Abby M. 
Schrader, Branding the Other/Tattooing the Self: Bodily Inscription among 
Convicts in Russia and the Soviet Union, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 184–85 
(Jane Caplan ed., 2000); DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 50.  
 49. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 49. 
 50. Alan Govenar, The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 
1846–1966, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 214–15 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000). 
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shaped tattooing.51 The introduction of electric machinery made 
tattooing cheaper, faster, and less painful.52 It also helped de-
velop a distinctive American aesthetic characterized by “strong 
black line . . .  heavy black shading; and a dab of color” from a 
limited palette emphasizing red, blue, and green.53
Tattooers in the United States were generally from the 
same working class backgrounds as their clients
 
54 and typically 
had no prior art training.55 Rather than create custom artwork 
for their clients, tattooers of this era worked almost exclusively 
from collections of pre-drawn images called “flash.”56 Designs 
included military insignia, ships, hearts, flowers, skulls, dag-
gers, snakes, tigers, Christian icons, and scantily clad women.57 
These same images, or minor variations on them, hung on the 
walls of nearly every tattoo shop of the era.58 When a tattooer 
came across an appealing new design, he copied it—sometimes 
directly off of the body of a willing client—and added it to his 
stock of flash.59 Some enterprising tattooers, first among them 
Lew Alberts and Charlie Western, sold sheets of flash to other 
tattooers.60
The combination of the electric tattoo machine and simple, 
pre-made flash designs enabled the industry to capitalize on 
the popularity of tattoos during the Interbellum period.
 
61 In 
many ways, the tattoo industry was structured around the 
needs of soldiers and sailors who frequented tattoo shops in 
large groups with limited leave time.62
 
 51. See U.S. Patent No. 464,801 (issued Dec. 8, 1891). Charlie Wagner pa-
tented improvements on O’Reilly’s device in 1904. See U.S. Patent No. 768,413 
(issued Aug. 23, 1904). 
 “Sailors came in,” one 
tattooer told me, “and you cranked them out as quickly as you 
[could] because they’re all on leave. The financial impetus was 
 52. Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing and 
Piercing in Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 240 (Jane 
Caplan ed., 2000); DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 50. 
 53. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 50.  
 54. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 234; R.I. Geare, Tattooing, SCI. AM., Sept. 
12, 1903, at 190. 
 55. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 51; Rubin, supra note 19, at 234. 
 56. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52–53; Govenar, supra note 50, at 217. 
 57. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52; Govenar, supra note 50, at 218–19. 
 58. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Govenar, supra note 50, at 217. 
 61. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 59. 
 62. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 63–65. 
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there to crank those [tattoos] out.”63 Soldiers and sailors during 
the World Wars also bolstered the popularity of tattooing 
among the general public and helped set trends in terms of tat-
too style, subject matter, and placement.64
But in the post-war period, the popularity of tattoos began 
to wane. Many soldiers returning from World War II realized 
that their tattoos were not as enthusiastically accepted outside 
of the military.
 
65 And unsanitary conditions in many tattoo 
shops raised serious public health concerns.66 Tattooers failed 
to sterilize equipment, used the same needles on successive 
customers; and drew ink from a shared container.67 After re-
ported hepatitis outbreaks, many state and local governments 
began to heavily regulate tattooing or ban it altogether, forcing 
many tattooers either out of town or out of business.68
Although tattooing continued, both in licensed shops and 
unlicensed back rooms, garages, and basements, the post-war 
period was a time of creative stagnation. Tattooers still relied 
largely on the same collection of flash designs prominent at the 
turn of the century.
 
69 But this period of creative stagnation and 
dwindling popularity set the stage for a fundamental shift in 
the industry.70
C. THE TATTOO RENAISSANCE 
 
For more than a century, the U.S. tattoo industry was de-
fined by flash. These simple, badge-like images offered 
tattooers a source of popular, ready-made designs that could be 
quickly and consistently applied to their customers.71 Flash met 
the needs of tattooers, who considered themselves craftsmen or 
tradesmen, with little interest in artistic expression for its own 
sake.72
 
 63. Interview with Subject 6, supra note 
 And it met the needs of clients, whose tattoos often 
8, at 54.  
 64. DEMELLO, supra note 29, 63–65. 
 65. Id. at 66–67; Govenar, supra note 50, at 229. 
 66. See, e.g., DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 62. 
 67. Id. at 62. 
 68. Govenar, supra note 50, at 229–32. For more on the legal regulation of 
the tattoo industry, see infra Part III.A. 
 69. See Govenar, supra note 50, at 217. 
 70. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235–36. 
 71. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 196 n.4. 
 72. See CLINTON R. SANDERS, CUSTOMIZING THE BODY: THE ART AND 
CULTURE OF TATTOOING 86 (2008); see also Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–35. 
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communicated group membership or commemorated milestones 
through established iconography.73
But beginning in the 1960s, tattooers began to 
reconceptualize their work.
 
74 Norman Keith Collins, better 
known as Sailor Jerry, was among the first and most important 
tattooers to challenge prevailing practices.75 Influenced by Jap-
anese tattoo traditions, he sought to elevate tattoo artistry in 
the United States by creating elaborate, stylistically and the-
matically consistent tattoos that incorporated the entire human 
body as a canvas.76 Tattoos tailored to a particular human form 
in the Japanese tradition stood in stark contrast to the typical 
American approach of unsystematically scattering small 
standalone images across the body.77
Over the next few decades, the innovations of Sailor Jerry 
and protégés like Cliff Raven
 
78 and Don Ed Hardy79 helped 
bring about three interlinked shifts in the industry that led to 
what some have called the tattoo renaissance.80 First, a new 
generation of tattooers was drawn to the industry because of its 
potential for artistic innovation and expression. Experienced 
and trained fine artists, many with graduate-level education, 
began to see tattooing as a viable and legitimate career path.81 
Second, the creative output of the tattoo industry changed as a 
result of the influx of artistically inclined tattooers. New tech-
niques and styles that drew on influences ranging from cubism 
to graffiti began to emerge.82 Third, the client base of the indus-
try underwent a transformation. As clients became more afflu-
ent, better educated, and more knowledgeable about tattoos 
and art generally, they developed higher expectations of tech-
nical skill and originality.83
 
 73. “When you had gone five thousand miles at sea, you got a bluebird on 
your chest. When you’d gone ten thousand, you got the second bird on the oth-
er side.” DEMELLO, supra note 
 
29, at 64 (quoting Doc Webb). 
 74. Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–35. 
 75. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 73–74. 
 76. Rubin, supra note 19, at 236–37; see also DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 
72–75. 
 77. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–35 (describing the “international folk 
style” of tattooing that characterized the early U.S. tattoo industry). 
 78. Id. at 236–41.  
 79. Id. at 241–45. 
 80. Id. at 233–36. 
 81. Id. at 235; SANDERS, supra note 72, at 19. 
 82. See DALE RIO & EVA BIANCHINI, TATTOO 12 (2004). 
 83. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235; see also DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 
92. 
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These three changes gave rise to the most important devel-
opment in the industry from the perspective of creative 
norms—custom tattooing.84 Rather than simply offer their cli-
ents a selection of flash from which to choose, tattooers increas-
ingly created unique bespoke designs for individual clients, cus-
tomized for both their tastes and their bodies.85
That’s how the old timers made their money, repeating stuff over and 
over again. When the new school guys came around, when I came 
around, and started doing original [one-of-a-kind] artwork on every-
body, the old timers looked at me like “Dude, you are crazy. Why do 
you want to do that? We’ve got plenty of designs that sell great.”
 Custom work 
provided tattooers an opportunity to create new pieces of origi-
nal art instead of re-inking old designs. To the older generation 
of tattooers, who saw their work primarily in financial rather 
than artistic terms, the choice to devote time and energy to cus-
tom designs was puzzling. As one tattooer described:  
86
As a result of these changes, the tattoo industry today is 
defined by two very different paradigms.
 
87 The street shop fits 
comfortably with the common public conception of a “tattoo par-
lor.”88 A garish neon sign flickers above the entrance.89 The 
walls are papered with flash designs. Clients walk in off of the 
street without appointments, select the image of their choice, 
and are tattooed by whichever tattooer happens to be free at 
the moment.90 Clients are often charged a pre-determined, 
cash-only flat rate.91 Most simple flash designs can be tattooed 
in well under an hour, sometimes as quickly as a few minutes.92 
Hundreds, likely thousands, of tattoo shops in the United 
States fit this basic model.93
 
 84. See Enid Schildkrout, Inscribing the Body, 33 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOL-
OGY 319, 336 (2004) (“As more and more middle-class people were tattooed, 
and as artists with formal art training in other media entered the profession 
. . . custom work increasingly replaced flash . . . .”). 
 
 85. See id. 
 86. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 58.  
 87. See, e.g., INKIES TATTOO STUDIO, http://www.inkiestattoo.com (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2013) (describing the tattoo shop as “high-end”). 
 88. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 8. 
 89. See, e.g., FINELINE, http://www.finelinetattoo.com (last visited Nov. 2, 
2013). 
 90. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 81–82. 
 91. See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 72, at 143. 
 92. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 54. 
 93. As of 2007, an estimated 15,000 tattoo shops operated in the United 
States. See Chafkin, supra note 3. 
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Less familiar to the public imagination is the high-end cus-
tom tattoo shop. Skull & Sword, a respected shop in San Fran-
cisco, is one example.94 Located on the second floor of nonde-
script building, the shop features minimal signage.95 Rather 
than accept walk-ins, tattooers book appointments several 
months in advance.96 Instead of flash hanging on the walls, 
each tattooer’s portfolio of custom tattoos is available for view-
ing.97 Custom tattoo clients are charged an hourly rate for the 
time spent applying the tattoo. At high-end shops, rates be-
tween $150 and $250 per hour are not uncommon—again, cash 
only.98 A sizable custom tattoo can take many hours to com-
plete, often requiring multiple appointments over the course of 
months.99
Most tattoo shops, and most tattooers, operate somewhere 
along a spectrum between these two paradigms, providing a 
combination of small, simple, pre-designed tattoos and more 
elaborate custom work.
 
100 Since most tattooers learn on the job 
through an apprenticeship, they commonly start with simple 
flash designs, developing the skills necessary for more complex 
custom designs over time.101 And because they work in both mi-
lieus, many tattooers self-consciously play the roles of both cre-
ator and copyist, a duality that informs and complicates indus-
try norms surrounding creative production.102 Tattooers work in 
a medium that has a long history of widely accepted copying of 
a corpus of shared images and iconography.103
 
 94. SKULL & SWORD, http://www.theskullandsword.com (last visited Nov. 
2, 2013). 
 That tradition, 
however, conflicts with the premium placed on originality as 
custom tattooing developed. 
 95. Skull & Sword, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/businesses/ 
212287593-skull-sword-san-francisco-ca.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 96. SKULL & SWORD, supra note 94. 
 97. Id. 
 98. “Cash only” is perhaps the only truly universal rule in the tattoo in-
dustry. See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 72, at 105, 143. 
 99. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 154. 
 100. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12 at 130 (explaining the grey area between 
tracing tattoos and creating new work). 
 101. As one tattooer explained, “When you are first starting off and learn-
ing to tattoo you don’t get to be picky. You don’t get to choose. Because you are 
trying to learn, you have to practice.” Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, 
at 57. 
 102. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130 (explaining 
that the tattooer had not been “doing anything [other prominent tattooers] 
had not been doing for 20 years”). 
 103. See, e.g., DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 37, 53. 
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II.  LAW, NORMS & TATTOOS   
A tattoo, like any other original work fixed in a tangible 
medium, is protected by copyright law. And like the other pub-
lic goods that copyright law protects, tattoos are susceptible to 
unauthorized reproduction.104 Once a tattooer creates a design 
and applies it to the skin of a client—particularly if an image of 
the tattoo is published on the internet or in print—non-rivalry 
and non-excludability lead to predictable results.105 Copying is a 
topic of perennial concern within the tattoo industry.106 But 
copyright lawsuits or other formal assertions of rights are ex-
ceedingly rare. Instead, tattooers have developed a set of in-
formal norms to structure the creative process and relation-
ships within their industry.107
A. FORMAL LEGAL PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS 
 This Part, after addressing the 
applicability of formal copyright protection, describes the key 
norms that have emerged within the industry. 
In the absence of some applicable exclusion or limitation,108 
copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression . . . .”109 Originality requires 
that a work is independently created rather than copied from 
preexisting material, and that it reflect a modicum of creativi-
ty.110 Although the standard for originality is low, its evaluation 
turns on both an objective analysis of the work and an exami-
nation of the process by which it was created.111
The fixation requirement ensures that the work is embod-
ied in a physical form “sufficiently permanent or stable to per-
mit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
 
 
 104. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 105. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (6th 
ed. 2011). 
 106. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 6–7 (explaining 
that copying is only acceptable within certain circumstances). 
 107. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12 at 130 (stating that tattooing is “not rein-
venting the wheel,” everything is based on copying). 
 108. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . 
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to 
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural fea-
tures that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing inde-
pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”). 
 109. Id. § 102(a). 
 110. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 111. Id. at 346–47. 
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for a period of more than transitory duration.”112 Fixation 
serves two functions. It helps reduce problems of proof by in-
sisting on a durable record of the protected work.113 Fixation al-
so helps ensure that works are preserved and disseminated for 
the benefit of future generations.114
In the case of a custom tattoo, the question of 
copyrightability must be addressed with regard to two distinct 
but related works. Tattooers occasionally ink an image free-
hand directly on a client’s skin.
 
115 But more often, they create a 
detailed line drawing of the tattoo design on paper.116 Once the 
line drawing is prepared, the tattooer copies it to a stencil, 
which when transferred to the client’s skin serves as a template 
for tattooing the outline of the design.117
Although the line drawing forms the basis for the tattoo, it 
differs from the final product on the client’s skin in important 
ways.
 
118 A drawing on paper is a two-dimensional representa-
tion. Depending on the location of the tattoo, the client’s body 
transforms that flat image to a three-dimensional work.119 Par-
ticularly for tattoos thoughtfully designed to take advantage of 
the shape of the client’s body, the shift to three dimension can 
dramatically alter the appearance of the tattoo.120 More gener-
ally, line drawings often lack the shading and color typically 
added to the final tattoo.121 If the tattoo embodies creative ex-
pression not reflected in the line drawing, it is probably best 
considered a derivative work in copyright terminology.122 But 
where the tattooer simply transfers the line drawing to the 
body without adding or altering its expression, the tattoo is 
properly understood as a mere reproduction.123
 
 112. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 
 113. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 
683, 730–34 (2003). 
 114. See Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 
1094–95 (2010). 
 115. Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 82. 
 116. See id. with Subject 9 at 82–83. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. with Subject 1 at 12. 
 119. Id. with Subject 8 at 71. 
 120. See id. with Subject 8 at 71–72. 
 121. Id. with Subject 7 at 64. 
 122. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 123. Id. 
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Line drawings fall squarely within the Copyright Act’s def-
inition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” works.124
The same basic analysis would seem to hold for the tattoo 
as applied to a human subject. To the extent the tattoo is inde-
pendently created and satisfies the low bar for creativity, it is 
original.
 A pencil 
or ink drawing on paper satisfies the fixation requirement. So 
assuming the work is not merely a copy of a preexisting work 
and reflects some amount of creativity, the line drawing is eli-
gible for copyright protection. This result is neither surprising 
nor controversial. 
125 And as your mother has no doubt warned you, tat-
toos are permanent. An indelible representation of a work easi-
ly meets the statute’s demand for a work “fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.”126 Tattoos then, like their pencil and 
paper counterparts, appear to be appropriate subjects of copy-
right protection.127
But a recent dispute over Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo gave 
one commentator an opportunity to challenge this seemingly 
straightforward result.
 
128 In 2003, Victor Whitmill tattooed an 
abstract image, inspired by Maori moko,129
 
 124. See id. §§ 101, 102(a). 
 on the face of former 
 125. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47 
(1991). 
 126. Id. 
 127. The existing literature on copyright in tattoos either assumes or con-
cludes as much. See Matthew Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual 
Property Law and Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1137 
(2012); Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 97 (2002); David Cummings, Creative Expression and the Human Can-
vas: An Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 279 (2013); Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement: 
Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 313 (2006); Christine Lesicko, Tattoos as Visual Art: How Body Art Fits 
into the Visual Artists Rights Act, 53 IDEA 39 (2013); Yolanda M. King, The 
Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013). 
 128. See Declaration of David Nimmer at 18, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. 
Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Nimmer 
Declaration] (“For copyright protection in tattoos to arise, Congress would 
have to act anew, in the manner of its 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act 
to afford protection to computer software and its 1990 amendment to the Cop-
yright Act to afford protection to architectural works.”). 
 129. See generally Peter Gathercole, Contexts of Maori Moko, in MARKS OF 
CIVILIZATION 171 (Arnold Rubin ed., 1988). 
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heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson.130 Tyson subse-
quently appeared in the Warner Brothers film The Hangover. 
In that film’s sequel, the same tattoo design was reproduced on 
the face of comedian Ed Helms as evidence of a night of drunk-
en decision-making.131 Whitmill, after seeing promotional mate-
rials for the film featuring his design, sued Warner Brothers to 
enjoin the release of the film.132
In an expert witness declaration, David Nimmer
 
133 offered 
a number of legal conclusions suggesting that Whitmill was not 
entitled to copyright protection for Tyson’s tattoo.134 Despite af-
firming in his oft-cited copyright treatise that a tattoo could 
“qualify as a work of graphic art, regardless of the medium in 
which it is designed to be affixed” including “human flesh,”135 
Nimmer argued in his capacity as an expert that Tyson’s skin 
did not qualify as a tangible medium of expression, comparing 
it to a frosty window pane or wet sand as the tide approaches.136 
But those quintessential examples of transitory media are a far 
cry from the lifelong fixation of a tattoo.137
More plausibly, Nimmer pointed to the useful article limi-
tation on pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as a separate 




 130. Complaint at 2, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-
00752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011).  
 The useful article doctrine pre-
cludes copyright protection for products whose purpose is utili-
tarian rather than expressive, largely eliminating copyright 
 131. Id. at 4. 
 132. Id. at 4–5. Whitmill’s copyright registration covers “artwork on [a] 3-D 
object” presumably because he created the tattoo directly on Tyson’s face with-
out first drawing the design on paper. See TRIBAL TATTOO, No. 
VA0001767704, available at http://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v1= 
1&ti=1,1&Search%5FArg=va0001767704&Search%5FCode=REGS&CNT=25& 
PID=FRK-tCFkHI5cOIoxALv0Rr_iVMy&SEQ=20130918145100&SID=1. 
 133. Nimmer has updated and revised Nimmer on Copyright since 1985. 
See David Nimmer, IRELL & MANELLA LLP, http://www.irell.com/professionals 
-51.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).  
 134. See generally Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128.  
 135. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 4 (citing NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 1.01[B][1][i] n.392 (1999)).  
 136. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 4; see also Ann Bartow, When 
a Treatise Writer Tries to Reconfigure Copyright Law to Benefit a Client, 
MADISONIAN.NET (May 25, 2011), http://madisonian.net/2011/05/25/when-a 
-treatise-writer-tries-to-reconfigure-copyright-law-to-benefit-a-client (noting 
Nimmer’s reversal). 
 137. See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 9.  
 138. Id. at 7–11. 
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protection for industrial design.139 Pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural elements incorporated into a useful article are protectable 
only to the extent they are physically or conceptually separable 
from the underlying article.140
But applying the standard test for separability, Tyson’s 
tattoo is easily divorced from his skin as a conceptual matter.
 Mike Tyson’s face, as Nimmer 
rightly noted, serves a primarily utilitarian, biological function. 
141 
Nimmer insisted, however, that “the only legally cognizable re-
sult is to apply the strict requirement of physical separabil-
ity.”142 Otherwise, he claimed the Copyright Act would “set to 
naught the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of badges of 
slavery.”143
At the root of Nimmer’s startling equation of willing recipi-
ents of tattoos with slaves is a concern over certain remedies 
available to a successful copyright plaintiff.
 
144 As he noted, cop-
yright protection could grant Whitmill control over Tyson’s 
public displays of the tattoo145 as well as reproductions of it in 
photographs or video.146 Nimmer worried that the derivative 
work right could give Whitmill some say over other tattoos Ty-
son might choose to apply to his face.147 And in the unlikely 
event the tattoo qualifies as a “work of recognized stature” un-
der the Visual Artists Rights Act, Tyson could be prevented 
from destroying or removing it.148
 
 139. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested 
Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983) (“Copy-
right law has reluctantly embraced a variety of works embodied in utilitarian 
objects, while simultaneously purporting to exclude the general province of 
industrial design.”). 
 
 140. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 
(2d Cir. 1987). 
 141. See id. at 1145 (“[W]here design elements can be identified as reflect-
ing the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional in-
fluences, conceptual separatability exists.”); see also King, supra note 127.  
 142. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 11. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 5–6. 
 145. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2012) (granting the copyright holder the exclu-
sive right to publicly display the work). 
 146. See id. § 106(1) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to 
reproduce the work). 
 147. See id. § 106(2) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to 
prepare derivatives based on the work). 
 148. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (granting the author of a work of visual art the 
right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature”). 
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Although the court characterized Nimmer’s arguments as 
“silly,” these potential consequences are indeed alarming.149 
Luckily, copyright law offers courts many tools aside from the 
blunt instrument of protectability that they could, and almost 
certainly would, use to avoid this parade of horribles. These in-
clude narrow readings of exclusive rights,150 fair use,151 first sale 
and related exhaustion doctrines,152 implied license,153 and equi-
table discretion over injunctive relief.154 But there is another 
reason of far more practical importance why Nimmer’s fears 
were unwarranted: the scenarios he envisioned are fundamen-
tally at odds with the established norms of the tattoo indus-
try.155
Copyright suits between tattooers and their clients, or 
suits between two tattooers, are virtually non-existent.
 
156 Most 
of the copyright litigation involving tattoos centers around tat-
too-inspired designs used on clothing or other merchandise.157
 
 149. See Joe Mullin, Tyson Tattoo Lawsuit: Studio’s Defenses Are ‘Silly,’ 
Says Judge, PAIDCONTENT (May 25, 2011), http://paidcontent.org/2011/05/25/ 
419-judge-shows-sympathy-for-plaintiffs-in-tyson-tattoo-case/. The parties 
subsequently agreed to dismiss the suit under the terms of an undisclosed set-
tlement. See David Kravets, Hangover Tattoo Infringement Lawsuit Settles, 
WIRED, June 22, 2011, 2:15 PM, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/ 
tattoo-flap-settled. 
 
 150. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879 
(2007). 
 151. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 152. See id.; see also Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Ex-
haustion and the Personal Use Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067, 2107 (2012). 
 153. See infra Part II.E; see also Michael Grynberg, Property Is a Two-Way 
Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 435, 454 (2010). 
 154. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 486, 505 (2001) (“It hardly 
follows from [a finding of infringement] that an injunction . . . must issue.”); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (1993) (describing 
how the goals of copyright law are “not always best served by automatically 
granting injunctive relief ” ); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (noting that issuing patent injunctions “in accordance 
with the principles of equity” is “consistent with [the Court’s] treatment of in-
junctions under the Copyright Act”). 
 155. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 40. 
 156. Whitmill, it should be stressed, did not bring a suit against his client. 
Tyson prominently displayed his tattoo in the first Hangover and other subse-
quent paid public appearances, including his current one man show on 
Broadway, without any objection from his tattooer. See Michael Wilson, For 
Tyson, a ‘Vulnerable’ Performance Outside the Ring, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2012, at A20. 
 157. See Crispin v. Audigier, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(discussing that tattoo designs were used on apparel, jewelry, and other mer-
chandise); Tattoo Art, Inc. v. Tat Int’l L.L.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d 645, 647 (E.D. 
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Occasionally tattooers sue each other on non-copyright 
grounds.158 And rarely, non-copyright litigation arises between 
tattooers and their clients.159
But not a single reported decision addresses a copyright 
claim brought by a tattooer against a client or a fellow tattooer. 
And the available record reveals only one such case even being 
filed in the United States.
 
160 In 2005, Portland tattooer Mat-
thew Reed filed a complaint against his client, Rasheed Wal-
lace, a former player for the NBA’s Portland Trailblazers.161 
Reed tattooed a custom image of an Egyptian family on Wal-
lace’s arm, for which Wallace paid Reed $450.162 Six years later, 
the advertising firm Wieden+Kennedy prominently featured 
Wallace’s tattoo in an advertising campaign for Nike.163 Reed, 
who had not authorized the use of the tattoo in the ad cam-
paign, registered a copyright in his drawing of the design and 
filed an infringement complaint against Nike, 
Wieden+Kennedy, and Wallace, which was eventually dis-
missed after a joint stipulation.164 Notably, although Reed’s cli-
ent was named as a party, it was the prominent use of the tat-
too in the ad campaign and not Wallace’s regular public 
displays of it that triggered the suit.165
 
Va. 2010) (noting flash designs licensed for use as airbrush stencils); S.T.R. 
Indus. v. Palmer Indus., 1999 WL 258455 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1999) (explaining 
that tattoo themed designs applied to pool cues).  
 
 158. See, e.g., Quidgeon v. Olsen, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42309, at *2–3 
(C.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2011) (explaining a trademark dispute between competing 
tattoo shops).  
 159. See, e.g., Minnifield v. Ashcraft, 903 So. 2d 818, 820 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2004) (demonstrating the invasion of privacy claim against tattooer for pub-
lishing photo without permission).  
 160. See Complaint, Reed v. Nike Inc., No. 05-CV-198 BR (D. Or. Feb. 10, 
2005). 
 161. Id. A similar dispute arose in the United Kingdom over the use of 
footballer David Beckham’s tattoos in an ad campaign. See Noam Cohen, On 
Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, A Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at 
A1. 
 162. Complaint, Reed, supra note 160.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 05-CV-
198 BR (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2005). 
 165. For a detailed discussion of Reed, see Harkins, supra note 127. Recent-
ly, Rick Genest a heavily tattooed model with distinctive facial tattoos settled 
a dispute with the producers of the television series American Horror Story 
over alleged copyright and likeness rights. Matthew Belloni, Fox Settles ‘Amer-
ican Horror Story’ Legal Spat Over 'Zombie Boy' Tattoo (Exclusive), 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr 
-esq/foxs-american-horror-story-zombie-379219. 
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Nonetheless, simply by bringing suit, Reed operated out-
side of the accepted norms of the tattoo industry.166 None of the 
tattooers I interviewed had registered copyrights in their cus-
tom designs or knew other tattooers who had, although most 
were aware that they could.167 None had been involved in a 
formal copyright dispute or knew other tattooers who had.168 
Most were dismissive of the notion of bringing a suit against a 
client or another tattooer.169 As one interview subject colorfully 
put it, a tattooer who sued another for copying would be “la-
beled kind of a wiener with thin skin.”170
Tattooers were somewhat more sympathetic to leveraging 
formal legal rights, as Whitmill did, to target unauthorized use 
of their designs on apparel or other merchandise.
 
171 But on the 
whole, they were reluctant to endorse reliance on the judicial 
system even under those circumstances.172 In part, this reluc-
tance is an outgrowth of general misgivings about the legal sys-
tem.173
B. CLIENT AUTONOMY 
 But as the rest of this Part demonstrates, it is largely an 
expression of more specific norms governing the creative pro-
cess and the tattooer-client relationship. 
Both during and after the design process, tattooers consist-
ently demonstrate a respect for client autonomy.174 To varying 
degrees, client input helps shape the design of a custom tat-
too.175 And once an image is created on the client’s skin, 
tattooers uniformly acknowledge that control over that image, 
with some limited exceptions, shifts to the client.176
The design process typically begins with a consultation, 
where the client presents the tattooer with a basic description 
 
 
 166. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 19; id. with Subject 3 at 
40; id. with Subject 6 at 50, 55–56; id. with Subject 11 at 110–11. 
 167. See, e.g., id. with Subject 1 at 14.  
 168. See, e.g., id. with Subject 3 at 40; id. with Subject 7 at 64. 
 169. Id. with Subject 2 at 26; id. with Subject 6 at 50; id. with Subject 11 at 
110–11. 
 170. Id. with Subject 2 at 26.  
 171. Id. with Subject 6 at 52–53, 55–56. 
 172. Id. with Subject 2 at 26; id. with Subject 6 at 50; id. with Subject 11 at 
110–11. 
 173. See infra Part III. 
 174. Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 111; id. with Subject 12 at 
128. 
 175. Id. with Subject 6 at 48–49; id. with Subject 10 at 96. 
 176. Id. with Subject 12 at 128. 
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of the imagery they envision for their tattoo.177 Those initial de-
scriptions vary in their specificity: “sometimes the customers 
bring a lot to the table with the design element. Other times 
they have no feedback and they’re just really open-
minded . . . .”178
Typically, the consultation is the beginning of an ongoing 
conversation between tattooer and client.
 
179 Because of their 
greater familiarity with theories of design and composition, as 
well as a clearer understanding of the limitations of the medi-
um, tattooers frequently guide their clients toward choices that, 
while true to the client’s original conception, are more likely to 
translate well into tattoos.180 After settling on basic questions of 
subject matter, style, and composition, the tattooer typically 
requires the client to pay a small cash deposit before drawing 
up the design.181 The deposit fee is then deducted from the 
eventual hourly-rate price of the tattoo.182 As a result, tattooers 
do not ultimately charge clients for their time and effort in cre-
ating a design.183
Once the tattooer draws an initial design, clients typically 
have an opportunity to request edits or revisions.
 
184 Most 
tattooers expect to make such changes.185 As one interview sub-
ject explained, “I don’t even get the line drawing finished all 
the way, so I don’t fall in love with it too much. Because once 
you fall in love with it, you don’t want to make any changes. 
And sometimes you can go in a direction that’s just not right 
[for the client].”186
 
 177. Id. with Subject 10 at 96; id. with Subject 11 at 108. 
 Even after the client and tattooer agree on 
 178. Id. with Subject 9 at 82.  
 179. Id. with Subject 11 at 108. 
 180. See id. with Subject 9 at 92; id. with Subject 11 at 108, 119. 
 181. Id. with Subject 2 at 19; id. with Subject 6 at 49; id. with Subject 7 at 
57. 
 182. “In order for them to get that tattooed from me, I need to do the art-
work. That’s part of the service. They’re putting down the deposit, and assum-
ing they’re not having me make 50 million revisions, it will eventually come off 
the price of the tattoo.” Id. with Subject 3 at 141. 
 183. See id. with Subject 6 at 49; id. with Subject 7 at 57; id. with Subject 
13 at 141. 
 184. See id. with Subject 7 at 57; id. with Subject 9 at 81; id. with Subject 
11 at 108; id. with Subject 12 at 125; id. with Subject 13 at 140. 
 185. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 184.  
 186. Id. with Subject 7 at 57. But a small minority of tattooers refuse to 
make edits. “I never redraw stuff, which is a weird rule. I always assume that 
if someone doesn’t like the way that I’ve drawn something that they just 
shouldn’t get [the tattoo] from me.” Id. with Subject 3 at 28. 
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the line drawing, other choices, such as color schemes, often in-
volve client input.187
Because custom tattoos are both commissioned and collab-
orative,
 
188 a copyright lawyer would be tempted to consider the 
tattooer-client relationship through the lenses of works made 
for hire and joint authorship.189
Custom tattoos are almost certainly not works made for 
hire as defined by the Copyright Act.
 Although strands of both of 
these approaches can be found in the thinking of tattooers, nei-
ther maps onto the norms of the tattoo industry particularly 
well. In short, application of these doctrines would suggest that 
tattooers are generally the sole copyright owners of the designs 
they create. But that level of control would conflict with the 
deeply engrained norm of client autonomy. 
190 A work made for hire is 
either: (1) a work created by an employee within the scope of 
her employment, or (2) a specially commissioned work that falls 
within one of nine enumerated categories and is subject to an 
express written agreement designating the work as one made 
for hire.191 Under standard common law agency principles, 
tattooers are not the employees of their clients.192 And although 
custom tattoos are specially commissioned, they are not among 
the enumerated statutory categories eligible for treatment as 
works made for hire.193
 
 187. Id. with Subject 7 at 57–58; id. with Subject 12 at 125; id. with Sub-
ject 13 at 140. 
 In addition, signed agreements that 
 188. E.g., id. with Subject 12 at 125 (explaining a woman that described 
the tattoo that she wanted, but left it up to the tattooer to draw). 
 189. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (discussing works made for hire 
and joint authorship). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. They may, however, be considered employees of the tattoo shop under 
some circumstances. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 750–51 (1989) (“To determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a 
court first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency, 
whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contrac-
tor.”). In one anomalous scenario, model Amina Munster registered the custom 
design created for her by tattooer, Tim Kern, as a work made for hire, appar-
ently under the misapprehension that Kern qualified as her employee. See 
Amina Munster, Tattoos and Copyright, TATTOODLES (Mar. 31, 2006), http:// 
www.tattoodles.com/magazine/editorial/147. 
 193. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (identifying the categories of works eligible as spe-
cially commissioned works made for hire). 
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contemplate copyright ownership are practically unheard of in 
the tattoo industry.194
Perhaps not surprisingly, the formal conclusions of copy-
right law do not dictate how tattooers conceptualize their own-
ership interests in their work.
 
195 As one tattooer explained, “I 
don’t feel necessarily a strong ownership over [my custom de-
signs], because a lot of the time it’s not necessarily my original 
idea. It’s stuff that I’m being commissioned for, so I see myself 
as more of a paid artist to bring visions to life.”196
Joint authorship likewise presents an imperfect fit be-
tween copyright doctrine and tattoo industry norms. A joint 
work is one “prepared by two or more authors with the inten-
tion that their contributions be merged into inseparable or in-
terdependent parts of a unitary whole.”
 
197 The highly collabora-
tive tattoo design process is strongly suggestive of the requisite 
intent. But the contributions of most clients are unlikely to 
meet the threshold of authorship.198 According to most courts, 
in order to be considered an author for joint work purposes, a 
party’s contribution must be independently copyrightable.199 
Although each tattoo features a mix of contributions from 
tattooer and client, clients typically contribute uncopyrightable 
ideas, not protected expression.200
Formal law would treat most custom tattoo designs as 
works created by the tattooer alone.
 
201 Nonetheless, the design 
process is deeply, and understandably, sensitive to client pref-
erences.202
 
 194. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 1, supra note 
 Clients, after all, exercise the final choice over 
8, at 12; id. with Subject 
2 at 24–25; id. with Subject 5 at 46. 
 195. See id. with Subject 12 at 125. 
 196. Id.  
 197. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 198. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069–71 (7th Cir. 
1994); see also Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (ex-
plaining that the Copyright Act “requires each author to make an inde-
pendently copyrightable contribution” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 199. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069–71; see also Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 
1231. 
 200. “[The client’s] contribution is their idea . . . so pretty valuable stuff. 
Sometimes they have next to nothing to offer, yet them just being willing and 
an open vehicle and canvas for what I can provide them is a lot as well.” Inter-
view with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 3. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea 
. . . .”). 
 201. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 202. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 22; id. with Subject 
10 at 96. 
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whether the design is ultimately transformed from a drawing 
on paper to a tattoo on the body. 
Once that transformation occurs, tattooers invariably ex-
press a commitment to the clients’ autonomy over their bodies 
and the tattoos that have become an integral part of them.203 
Far from seeing them as slaves or “cattle,” tattooers recognize 
the freedom and individuality of their clients.204
It’s not mine anymore. You own that, you own your body. I don’t own 
that anymore. I own the image, because I have [the drawing] taped up 
on my wall and I took a picture of it. That’s as far as my ownership 
goes. [Claiming control over the client’s use of the tattoo is] ridiculous. 
That goes against everything that tattooing is. A tattoo is like an af-
firmation that it is your body . . . that you own your own self, because 
you’ll put whatever you want on your own body. For somebody else to 
say, “Oh no, I own part of that. That’s my arm.” No, it’s not your fuck-
ing arm, it’s my fucking arm. Screw you.
 When asked 
whether she had any right to control the display, reproduction, 
or other use of a client’s tattoo, one tattooer offered the follow-
ing response, which accurately captures both the substance and 
fervor of the industry norm: 
205
Copyright law limits the author’s right to control a work 
after a transfer of ownership of a copy of that work.
 
206 The first 
sale doctrine, which terminates the distribution right after a 
lawful transfer of title in a copy, is the most familiar example of 
copyright law’s exhaustion principle, but not the only one.207 
Section 109(c) of the Copyright Act, for example, provides that 
the owner of a copy of work is entitled to display that work pub-
licly.208 As a result, when Mike Tyson walks down the street or 
appears on Broadway, he runs no risk of infringement. But the 
Copyright Act does not generally extend to the owner of a copy 
any unique privilege to reproduce the work or create deriva-
tives based on it.209
 
 203. Id. with Subject 11 at 111; id. with Subject 12 at 128. 
 
 204. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 5 (“Copyright law thereby be-
comes the instrument to impose, almost literally, a badge of involuntary servi-
tude, akin to the mark with which ranchers brand the cattle they own.”). 
 205. Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 128 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 206. See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
 207. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 208. Id. § 109(c). 
 209. But see id. § 117 (enabling owners of copies of computer programs to 
creative derivative works and reproductions). The common law rule of copy-
right exhaustion also extends beyond the statutory limitations to embrace un-
authorized reproductions and derivatives under limited circumstances. See 
generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA 
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Tattooers, in contrast, embrace a more robust set of ex-
haustion rights favoring their clients.210 In addition to public 
displays of their tattoos, they acknowledge clients’ rights to re-
produce images of their tattooed bodies, whether by uploading 
images to their Facebook profiles, submitting photos for publi-
cation in tattoo magazines, or even reproducing a picture of the 
tattoo for commercial purposes.211 As one tattooer recounted, 
“I’ve had guys say, ‘I’m getting ready to put out a CD and I 
want to put [a picture of my tattoo] on the CD cover.’ That’s 
flattering. As far as I’m concerned, they own their arm. They 
own that piece of work.”212
Tattooers also recognize that clients are free to create new 
works that incorporate or even destroy their original designs.
 
213 
New designs frequently use the client’s existing tattoos as a 
starting point for expansion, regardless of who did the original 
work.214 And clients with poorly executed tattoos often ask more 
skilled tattooers for a “coverup”—a new tattoo that entirely 
conceals the existing one.215 None of the tattooers with whom I 
spoke expressed any reservation about these widespread prac-
tices.216 Assuming these new tattoos would constitute derivative 
works in the first place, tattoo industry norms would seem 
more forgiving than formal copyright law, which places the cre-
ation of derivative works within the copyright holder’s discre-
tion.217
But under prevailing industry norms, not all client uses 
are acceptable.
 
218 Tattooers distinguish between uses of the tat-
too as applied to the body, which are universally accepted, and 
uses of the tattoo design as a work disconnected from the body, 
which are subject to greater skepticism.219
 
L. REV. 889 (2011). 
 For example, one 
tattooer told me:  
 210. See Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 68 (stating that the in-
dividual receiving the tattoo commissioned the work, thus the tattooer does 
not believe that he has “rights” over it). 
 211. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 14–15; id. with Subject 5 at 
45; id. with Subject 8 at 68; id. with Subject 10 at 98. 
 212. Id. with Subject 8 at 68.  
 213. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 211.  
 214. Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 69. 
 215. Id.; see also id. with Subject 6 at 54; id. with Subject 7 at 62–63. 
 216. E.g., id. with Subject 8 at 69. 
 217. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 218. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21; id. with Subject 13 
at 142. 
 219. See id. with Subject 2 at 21; id. with Subject 13 at 142. 
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If [a client] wanted to then take [the tattoo design] and give it to a 
graphic artist and have him turn it into an image [for a commercial 
use], then I’d have a problem with that, or at least I’d feel like I 
should get some kind of compensation for it. But if it was just a photo 
[of the tattoo] . . . even if it’s the centerpiece [of an advertisement], I’m 
OK with that.220
Although copyright litigation remains quite rare in the tat-
too industry, disputes situated at the edge of the client auton-
omy norm may prove the most likely to spur formal enforce-
ment efforts.
 
221 Tattooer Christopher Escobedo recently filed 
suit against the developer of UFC Undisputed 3, a video game 
featuring Escobedo’s client, mixed martial arts fighter Carlos 
Condit.222 Escobedo alleged that the game infringed his copy-
right by including a digital representation of the lion tattoo he 
created on Condit’s torso.223
The developer’s use of the lion tattoo arguably trans-
gressed the limits of the client autonomy norm because its use 
while in connection with a digital representation of Condit, was 
detached from the client’s body.
 
224 However, Escobedo’s decision 
to sue departs from the background norm against litigation.225 
In cases such as this one or the Hangover 2 dispute—where use 
is made by a third party not subject to the substantive norms of 
the tattoo community, the client is not named as a defendant, 
and significant economic value is at stake—the general norm 
disfavoring litigation may be particularly susceptible to ero-
sion.226
Those rare cases aside, tattoo industry norms place a pre-
mium on establishing and maintaining the relationship be-
tween the tattooer and the client.
 
227 As one interview subject 
put it, “To get a great tattoo, it’s a full surrender into trust and 
faith in the tattooer.”228
 
 220. Id. with Subject 13 at 142. 
 In part, that relationship of trust is fa-
 221. Complaint, Escobedo v. THQ, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02470 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 
2012). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 2–4. 
 224. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21; id. with Subject 13 
at 142. 
 225. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 15–16; id. with Subject 
2 at 21; id. with Subject 3 at 31–32. 
 227. See id. with Subject 1 at 3; id. with Subject 11 at 108. 
 228. Id. with Subject 1 at 3. 
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cilitated by the tattooer’s recognition of client autonomy.229
C. REUSING CUSTOM DESIGNS 
 But 
as the next section demonstrates, those obligations to the client 
manifest themselves in other, ongoing ways.  
Tattooers are frequently asked to replicate their own cus-
tom designs on subsequent clients.230 After perusing a tattooer’s 
portfolio, a new client—typically a tattoo novice—will identify a 
custom design tattooed on an existing client and ask the 
tattooer for the same tattoo.231 As a rule, tattooers refuse to ap-
ply one client’s custom tattoo to a second client.232 Those re-
quests are most often met with the frank response, “No. 
[That’s] someone else’s tattoo.”233
The norm against reuse of custom designs is rooted in 
three primary concerns: the tattooer’s own artistic interest in 
variety,
  
234 the original client’s expectation of a one-of-a-kind 
tattoo,235 and an obligation to develop a design that more closely 
suits the needs of the second client.236
Most custom tattooers take pride in their ability to create 
distinct tattoos for each of their clients.
 
237 One tattooer told me 
she “would never put a custom tattoo that [she] created for an 
individual client on another client . . . . because . . . [she] 
th[ought] it [would] compromise [her] integrity as a tattooer, 
and just as an artist in general.”238 Another interview subject 
explained the reluctance to reuse designs in simpler terms: 
“[I]t’s no fun . . . .”239
Aside from creative self-interest, tattooers expressed “em-
pathy” or “respect” for and an “ethical duty” to clients who en-
 
 
 229. See, e.g., id. with Subject 11 at 108 (explaining that tattooers take 
suggestions from the client because ultimately it is his/her tattoo). 
 230. E.g., id. with Subject 6 at 49; id. with Subject 10 at 97; id. with Sub-
ject 12 at 126. 
 231. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 230. 
 232. See supra Interview Subject accompanying note 230. 
 233. Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 49. 
 234. See id. with Subject 6 at 49 (“I just don’t want to. I’ve already done 
that tattoo.”). 
 235. See id. with Subject 7 at 58 (explaining that an existing tattoo can be 
used as inspiration). 
 236. Id. with Subject 2 at 19; id. with Subject 5 at 42–43. 
 237. See id. with Subject 1 at 5–6; id. with Subject 11 at 109. 
 238. Id. with Subject 11 at 109. 
 239. Id. with Subject 2 at 19. 
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trust them to design and apply custom tattoos.240 Some see 
their obligation in almost contractual terms.241 One tattooer 
told me, “I designed that custom for that person with an under-
standing. The agreement I basically made with them was that 
this design was for that person and that person alone.”242 But 
these understandings are not acknowledged expressly.243
Still other tattooers think of their duty as an outgrowth of 
the collaborative design process.
  
244 Reusing a custom tattoo is 
wrong because the tattooer is not solely responsible for the de-
sign: “The unwritten law [against reusing custom designs] says 
that this is a product of the relationship between [the tattooer] 
and [the client].”245
Tattooers take this norm against reuse seriously, refusing 
to reapply the same design unless they receive explicit permis-
sion from the original client, as one anecdote illustrates: 
 
I tattooed a rock star [with a custom design that incorporated his 
daughter’s name]. And I had his wife come in and ask for the exact 
same tattoo. “It’s my daughter too, I love the way you designed it.” 
And I told her “you need to call him and ask him. If you call him and 
he’s okay with it, then I’ll do it.” But because it’s a design we came up 
with together, it was an agreement that we had.246
This sense of obligation extends to the second client as 
well.
 
247 Since most first time clients are unfamiliar with the 
process at custom tattoo shops—or even the distinction be-
tween street and custom shops—tattooers often find themselves 
playing the role of educator.248 First time clients, familiar with 
the flash-driven stereotype of a tattoo shop, are often unaware 
that they can commission a customized design.249 Others lack 
familiarity with design principles and vocabulary and feel ill 
equipped to describe their ideas.250
 
 240. Id. with Subject 2 at 19; id. with Subject 11 at 109; id. with Subject 12 
at 126. 
 Tattooers often treat re-
 241. Id. with Subject 13 at 141. 
 242. Id.  
 243. See id. with Subject 13 at 142 (explaining “’I can do something like 
that. What are the elements that you really like about it?’”). 
 244. Id. with Subject 1 at 3. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. with Subject 7 at 64. 
 247. See id. with Subject 5 at 42–43 (stating that there is a general agree-
ment that exact tracing of another tattoo is off limits). 
 248. See id. with Subject 6 at 48 (explaining to first timers that an exact 
tracing cannot be done because it is someone else’s tattoo). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. with Subject 11 at 107. 
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quests to repeat a custom design as a starting point for evaluat-
ing the client’s true interests.251
I’ll tell them that’s somebody else’s tattoo. So we can be inspired by 
their work. You’ve got to be inspired by something. And I’ll try to get 
more specific. What is it that you like about it? [Is] [i]t the blue, do 
you like the way it’s drop shadowed, is [it] the subject matter? What 
is it in particular? So when you find that out, most people don’t want 
to copy other people’s tattoos. They really don’t.
 One tattooer’s response to such 
requests offers an example of this approach: 
252
The custom design process can take many forms.
 
253 Some 
designs are primarily the work of the tattooer,254 others are 
largely dictated by specific client input,255 and still others are 
true collaborations.256 But regardless of the particulars of the 
design process, tattooers agree that reusing a custom design on 
another client contravenes industry norms.257
Adherence to the norms respecting client autonomy and 
disfavoring reuse of custom designs is widespread within the 
tattoo industry.
 
258 These client-centered norms are non-
controversial in part because the behaviors they proscribe are 
clearly defined.259
D. COPYING CUSTOM DESIGNS 
 As discussed below, the broader norm against 
copying the custom designs of other tattooers—though wide-
spread—gives rise to more frequent disagreement because its 
precise contours are far more open to interpretation. 
The norm against copying custom tattoo designs, while 
widely shared among tattooers, is susceptible to a range of in-
terpretations.260 Although literal copying of another tattooer’s 
custom design clearly violates the norm,261
 
 251. Id. with Subject 7 at 58; id. with Subject 12 at 131. 
 tattooers vary con-
siderably in their evaluation of more subtle forms of copying 
 252. Id. with Subject 7 at 58. 
 253. Id.with Subject 3 at 27–28. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. with Subject 6 at 48–49. 
 256. Id. with Subject 3 at 28; id. with Subject 5 at 45. 
 257. E.g., id. with Subject 2 at 19–20; id. with Subject 3 at 34. 
 258. See id. with Subject 11 at 111; id. with Subject 3 at 27–28; id. with 
Subject at 12 at 128. 
 259. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 258. 
 260. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 5; id. with Subject 6 at 
51. 
 261. See supra Interviews Subjects accompanying note 260.  
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that borrow abstract rather than literal design elements.262 
These differing estimations of the line separating impermissi-
ble copying from permissible inspiration, transformation, and 
evolution result in disputes between tattooers.263
This section will explore approaches to non-literal copying 
within the tattoo industry, the variety of informal enforcement 
mechanisms employed by tattooers when norm violations occur, 
and the assortment of perceived harms that motivate those re-
sponses. 
  
1. Defining Copying 
Every tattooer interviewed agreed that literal copying of 
another tattooer’s custom design transgresses industry 
norms.264 Literal copyists, considered “the lowest of the low” 
among tattooers, are referred to as “tracers,”265 “biters,”266 and 
“hacks”267 and closely associated with “scratchers,” a derogatory 
term for tattooers with limited artistic and technical skill.268 
Likewise derided are tattooers who, while they may redraw or 
refine elements of a design, closely reproduce the basic subject 
matter, composition, and style of a custom tattoo.269
A custom tattoo designed by Guen Douglas subsequently 





 Figure 1 below shows the original design  
 
 262. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 5; id. with Subject 6 at 
51. 
 263. See, e.g., id. with Subject 3, at 40 (recounting a Facebook feud between 
the subject and another tattooer). 
 264. See id. with Subject 2 at 19–20; id. with Subject 3 at 34. 
 265. Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130. 
 266. See id. 
 267. Id. with Subject 12 at 132. 
 268. SANDERS, supra note 72, at 34. 
 269. See Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 112 (stating that a 
tattooer that bluntly copied another design has no ethics). 
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Douglas tattooed on her client; Figure 2 depicts a literal copy 
created by another tattooer.271
As the images demonstrate, every element of the original cus-
tom tattoo was appropriated.  
 
The subject matter, composition, outline, shading, color 
choices, text, and even placement on the body were copied. Of 
course, given the hand-fashioned nature of tattoos, not to men-
tion variations in skin tone and body shape among clients, no 
two tattoos are ever identical.272 But these two images repre-
sent the extreme of literal copying within the medium.273
 
 271. Id. 
  
 272. Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 71. 
 273. See Douglas, supra note 270 (discussing the difference between the 
sharing of ideas amongst peers and the replicating of a previously commis-
sioned art piece on a new client as-is). 
Fig. 1 Fig. 2 
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Although the tattoo depicted in Figure 3 offers some varia-
tions on the original custom design in terms of color and text, 




These examples of literal or close copying present uncon-
troversial violations of industry norms.275 At the other end of 
the spectrum, tattooers generally treat purely abstract ideas, 
defined in terms of subject matter or style, as free for the tak-
ing.276
 
 274. See Interview with Subject 7, supra note 
 In one tattooer’s estimation, “Maybe it’s your idea, may-
be it’s your client’s idea, but you just don’t have ownership over 
that idea. It existed before your tattoo. So to say [for example], 
8, at 61–62; id. with Subject 
11 at 112; Douglas, supra note 270. 
 275. See Interview with Subject 2 supra note 8, at 19–20; id. with Subject 3 
at 34. 
 276. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12, at 131. 
Fig. 3 
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‘That’s my owl and hourglass,’ is just stupid.”277 Between these 
two extremes, however, tattooers lack any widely accepted def-
inition of impermissible copying.278
Interview subjects consistently referred to the wide swath 
of borrowing, situated between literal tracing and drawing up-
on common themes or ideas, as a grey area.
 
279 Whether a par-
ticular instance of borrowing runs counter to industry norms 
hinges on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding 
the design of the tattoos at issue, rendering ex ante determina-
tions difficult.280 As one tattooer explained, “In that grey area, 
there isn’t a line until someone draws it. But that’s always ret-
roactive. The line is identified as being crossed after the fact. 
You can’t identify it.”281
Within this grey area, tattooers are sensitive to the risk of 
treading too closely to another custom design.
 
282 In response, 
some adopt strategies to reduce the risk of running afoul of the 
anti-copying norm.283 When faced with a client who asks for a 
copy of a custom tattoo, they deconstruct—or in their words 
“dissect[]” or “reverse engineer[]”—the design to isolate the par-
ticular elements that appeal to the client and create a new de-
sign.284
Others try to insulate themselves from the potential influ-




 277. Id. 
 One 
tattooer said that if a client brings in a photo of another tattoo 
as a reference for a new design, “I don’t even want to look at 
that. Don’t put that in the back of my head, I don’t want to see 
 278. See id. with Subject 12 at 130–31. 
 279. See id. with Subject 2 at 41 (arguing that it is impossible to distin-
guish “copying” from “not copying”). 
 280. See id. with Subject 6 at 51 (stating that if a tattooer is copying from a 
photograph that is different than copying from another person’s tattoo). 
 281. Id. That description of the elusive line separating idea from expression 
calls to mind Learned Hand’s apothegm.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
45 F.2d 119, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has ever been able to fix that 
boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can . . . . [W]hile we 
are as aware as any one that the line, wherever [sic] it is drawn, will seem ar-
bitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts 
must answer in nearly all cases . . . [w]hatever may be the difficulties a pri-
ori.”). 
 282. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 41 (explaining that he 
would not send his portfolio to anyone for fear that it would be copied). 
 283. See id. with Subject 6 at 50–51 (noting that some tattooers purposeful-
ly do not copy). 
 284. Id. with Subject 5 at 50; see also id. with Subject 4 at 42–43.  
 285. See id. with Subject 2 at 19. 
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it.”286 Others studiously avoid looking at the work of other tat-
toos as a general rule to avoid undue influence. Otherwise, 
“you’ll draw from [other custom designs] subconsciously, no 
matter what.”287
But most tattooers are not quite so troubled by the pro-
spect of non-literal borrowing.
 
288 Many see some degree of copy-
ing as an unavoidable, and occasionally desirable, consequence 
of the creative process.289 The tattoo industry is steeped in tra-
dition. And while more recent crops of tattooers have distanced 
themselves, on a technical level, from the primitive work of 
generations past,290 they simultaneously demonstrate a certain 
reverence for traditional tattoo aesthetics.291 Clients are like-
wise drawn to the rich iconography of tattoo history.292 Daggers, 
ships, and roses—although drawn with more artistry—remain 
staples within the contemporary tattoo industry.293
Because of the constraints of their milieu, drawing from 
the common pool of traditional design elements is often inevi-
table.
  
294 “[T]attooing and the imagery within the industry, it’s 
so homogenous and everything is so iconic. You can’t just stake 
claim to something like that.”295 Or as another tattooer put it, 
referring to the ornamental fish common in traditional Japa-
nese tattooing, “a koi is a koi is a koi.”296 In light of those con-
straints, tattooers recognize that claims of similarity between 
custom designs must be tempered by the influence of stylistic 
and subject-matter conventions.297
 
 286. Id. 
 
 287. Id. with Subject 12 at 136. This worry is similar to the theory of sub-
conscious copying adopted by the court in Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. 
Harrisongs Music Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 288. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130; see also id. with 
Subject 11 at 113. 
 289. See id. with subject 11 at 113 (discussing the benefits of learning from 
other tattooers). 
 290. See id. with Subject 6 at 53 (noting that tattooers have become more 
advanced in their tattooing abilities compared to tattooers of the “tattoo re-
naissance”). 
 291. See id. with Subject 12 at 130 (discussing some of his inspirations). 
 292. See The Meaning of Old School Tattoos, TATTOO JOY (2012), http:// 
tattoojoy.com/meaning-old-school-tattoo.htm (discussing tattoo history). 
 293. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130. 
 294. See id. with Subject 11 at 113. 
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. with Subject 1 at 15 (discussing the difference between custom 
designs by style versus custom design influenced by subject matter). 
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The scènes à faire doctrine in copyright law is premised on 
a similar insight.298 Courts have acknowledged that where two 
works both contain elements common to a given setting or gen-
re, “infringement cannot be based on those elements alone (or 
principally) but instead on the elements that are not inevitable 
in the genre in question.”299 Just as “drunks, prostitutes, ver-
min and derelict cars would appear in any realistic work about 
the work of policemen in the South Bronx,”300 traditional Amer-
ican tattoos are likely to depict swallows, anchors, and roses 
with bold outlines and bright colors.301 As Figure 4 illustrates, 
such tattoos often share much in common even in the absence 
of copying. To the extent a custom tattoo fits within the con-





The notion of a shared commons of established tattoo styles 
and imagery helps explain some exceptions to the general norm 
against copying. One interview subject told me: 
If [the artist is] dead, you can copy it. If that person has been around 
a long time and is highly respected and revered, and he was a trail-
blazer of a certain style, it just goes without saying that people are go-
ing to have to follow that in order to find their own way. . . .303
As discussed below, these exceptions also reflect tattooers’ 
ideas about the kinds of harm the anti-copying norm is meant 
 
 
 298. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:24 (2013). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 301. See Art Rivera, Old School Tattoos: History, Examples, Symbolism, 
New Ways of Usage, DESIGN FLOAT BLOG (June 7, 2013) http://www 
.designfloat.com/blog/2013/06/07/oldschool-tattoos/. 
 302. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 3. 
 303. Id. with Subject 1 at 5.  
Fig. 4 
  
548 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:511 
 
to protect against.304
The skepticism tattooers express about originality is not 
limited to traditional tattoo imagery.
 However, it is also indicative of a recogni-
tion that copying is sometimes a necessary component of the 
creative process.  
305 Regardless of subject 
matter or style, they see copying as integral to their creative 
enterprise.306 In part, this attitude reflects the eagerness with 
which tattooers have mined other cultures, media, and art 
forms to satisfy client demands.307 As Ed Hardy, one of the ear-
ly pioneers of contemporary tattooing, explained, “tattooing is 
the great art of piracy. . . . Tattoo artists have always taken 
images from anything available that customers might want to 
have tattooed on them.”308
Many tattooers embrace the role influence and inspiration 
play in the creative process. Even for tattooers who create new 
custom designs for each client, true originality is often more 
myth than reality:  
  
Everything we’re doing is copying. Everything I’ve ever done is copy-
ing. Everything I’ve done is inspired by somebody else. I’m not doing 
anything new that [other tattooers] haven’t done 20 years ago. . . . I 
don’t feel ashamed about it [sic] and I don’t feel bummed out on 
that.309
Others see copying as a form of creative dialog that should 
not only be accepted but celebrated.
 
310 One tattooer explained 
that “[i]f someone takes something I’ve done and [he is] in-
spired by it, takes it, reworks it, and makes it even better[,] 
[t]hat’s not going to make me upset. That’s going to make me 
say, dude, I can step it up too.”311
Tattooers agree that literal and close copying violate indus-
try norms.
  
312 But outside of those easy cases, tattooers exhibit a 
range of attitudes when their custom designs share common el-
ements.313
 
 304. See infra Part II.D.3. 
 Some see any degree of conscious or subconscious 
 305. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130–31 (discussing 
copying a new style or technique). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See Benson, supra note 52, at 242. 
 308. Id. at 243 (quoting Don Ed Hardy). 
 309. Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130.  
 310. See id. with Subject 7 at 61. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. with Subject 5 at 43. 
 313. See id. with Subject 8 at 70 (discussing different reactions tattoo art-
ists have). 
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borrowing as something to be avoided, while others embrace 
the influence of their peers.314 Not surprisingly, tattooers faced 
adopt a range of stances when confronted with copying.315
2. Detection & Enforcement 
 
Custom tattoos are inherently private works.316 Aside from 
the client’s social acquaintances and customers browsing the 
tattooer’s portfolio, few people have occasion to view a custom 
tattoo.317 Therefore, they have been less susceptible to copying 
than the mass media products at the center of most copyright 
litigation. For this reason, many tattooers were skeptical of the 
rise of tattoo magazines in decades past because they posed an 
increased risk of copying.318 But today, images of custom tattoos 
are more accessible than ever.319 Tattooers and tattoo shops 
post photos of their work on their websites; clients share photos 
of their tattoos on social networks like Facebook; and 
microblogging sites like Tumblr and Pinterest feature thou-
sands of photos of custom tattoos, often without attribution to 
either the tattooer or the client.320 This widespread availability 
of custom tattoo images—combined with an influx of inexperi-
enced tattooers and clients—has resulted in a marked increase 
in literal and close copying within the tattoo industry.321
The majority of tattooers shared at least one anecdote of 
their custom tattoo designs being copied by another tattooer in 
violation of the anti-copying norm.
 
322 In most of these stories, 
the internet played a role in enabling both access to the original 
tattoo and detection of the copy.323
 
 314. Compare id. with Subject 3 at 34 (“I don’t believe in homage at all.”), 
with id. with Subject 8 at 70 (“I would feel flattered.”).  
 Tattooers often discover cop-
 315. See id. with Subject 8 at 70.  
 316. See id. with Subject 7 at 62 (explaining that the tattoo will only be 
seen on the tattooed person).  
 317. See id.  
 318. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 34–37. 
 319. See Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 83 (discussing accessi-
bility of tattoos on the internet). 
 320. See, e.g., #tattoo, TUMBLR (Sept. 26, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://www 
.tumblr.com/tagged/tattoos (illustrating numerous tattoos and tattooers at 
work). 
 321. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 175–76 (explaining inexperienced 
tattooers and copying). 
 322. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 88 (describing a 
time when his tattoo of a lion ended up on TUMBLR on a girl that he never 
tattooed).  
 323. See id. 
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ies when clients, friends, or other tattooers recognize a copied 
design and bring it to their attention.324 None of the tattooers 
with whom I spoke have actively searched for copies of their 
work.325
Technology also plays a role in the various enforcement 
mechanisms employed by tattooers.
 
326 Face to face responses to 
copying do sometimes occur if two tattooers happen to work in 
the same city or encounter each other at one of the many tattoo 
conventions across the country.327 But because of the national 
and international scope of the tattoo industry, email, Facebook, 
and tattoo-specific online discussion boards are increasingly the 
loci of enforcement efforts.328
When tattooers encounter what they consider copies of 
their work, they typically adopt one of three basic strategies: 
inaction, direct communication, or negative gossip.
 
329 Many 
tattooers, typically those with more than a decade of experi-
ence, told me that, while they recognize that copying is incon-
sistent with the norms and expectations of the industry, they 
have no interest in pursuing any recourse, formal or informal, 
against copyists.330 One tattooer, after describing a scenario in 
which a custom sleeve—a tattoo occupying the client’s entire 
arm, from shoulder to wrist—was traced by another tattooer 
explained, “[y]ou can’t control other people. If you try to live 
your life controlling other people, good luck with that. It’s dis-
heartening, but you have to let that stuff go.”331
Other tattooers communicate directly with copyists.
 
332 The-
se conversations range from the friendly to the overtly confron-
tational.333
 
 324. See id. with Subject 11 at 111 (noting that his friend relayed instances 
of copying that were discovered at a tattoo convention). 
 Some veteran tattooers see instances of copying as 
 325. Id. 
 326. See id. with Subject 12 at 132 (discussing an internet response to cop-
ying). 
 327. See id. with Subject 13 at 150 (describing an altercation at a conven-
tion). 
 328. See Beasley, supra note 127, at 1172–73 (describing how tattoo artists 
use the internet to search for copying). 
 329. See id. at 1166–68. 
 330. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 60 (explaining that 
tattooers do not “do anything” because “imitation is the highest form of flat-
tery”). 
 331. Id.; see also Beasley, supra note 127, at 1168. 
 332. Beasley, supra note 127, at 1168. 
 333. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 134 (describing a range 
of reactions from playful teasing to intense anger). 
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an opportunity to educate their less experienced colleagues.334 
One tattooer said he “might politely or tactfully offer some 
guidance” to someone who copied his design, in hopes that the 
copyist would change his behavior and grow as an artist.335 An-
other tattooer suggested that a common response to minor in-
stances of copying is “teasing” or “calling each other out” in a 
way that acknowledges the borrowing without any direct accu-
sation of wrongdoing.336 Less affably, other tattooers described 
sending “[a] strongly worded email” to confront a copyist.337
One subject reported a minor physical altercation between 
two tattooers over allegations of copying, but physical violence 
in the tattoo industry today is uncommon.
  
338
[T]here are nicer people who are tattooing now. That in turn makes 
people less scared to rip somebody off, because they maybe haven’t 
been in the tattoo world long enough to ever have that fear that 
someone might break their hand or something, which people did when 
I first started tattooing.
 Several interview 
subjects, however, spoke of the very real threat of violence in 
earlier eras of tattooing: 
339
As tattooers with art school degrees replaced bikers and ex-
convicts,
 
340 instances of physical violence, arson, and other ex-
treme consequences of violating community norms disap-
peared.341
Today, rather than grievous bodily harm, the primary con-
sequence tattooers face for copying is negative gossip.
 
342 
Tattooers mention “public shaming,” “blacklist[ing],” and “shit 
talking” as the most common means of responding to copy-
ists.343
 
 334. See id. with Subject 1 at 15 (stating that rather than taking a copying 
matter to court, tattooers will educate others on the taboos surrounding copy-
ing). 
 Despite its size and geographic scope, many interview 
subjects described the tattoo industry as a tight-knit communi-
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. with Subject 12 at 134. 
 337. Id. with Subject 2 at 22. 
 338. Id. at 23. 
 339. Id. with Subject 3 at 39. 
 340. See id. with Subject 11 at 122 (discussing a change in tattoo artists’ 
demographics). 
 341. See id. with Subject 7 at 62–63 (“In the old days there were definitely 
consequences. You couldn’t set up shop. If you copied a flash instead of paying 
for it, they’d break your hands, beat you up, burn your shop down, tell every-
one I know that you are a rip off artist.”).  
 342. See Beasley, supra note 127, at 1167. 
 343. Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 22, 23; id. with Subject 7 at 
62. See also Beasley, supra note 127, at 1167–68. 
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ty.344 As a result, gossip can have serious social and professional 
consequences: “[S]ocially, you’re screwed. In the community, 
you’re screwed. . . . Being part of the community is a really 
strong, important part of your growth . . . .”345
This gossip spreads primarily among tattooers; clients are 
rarely in a position to know that a tattooer has earned a repu-
tation for copying.
 
346 So although they may feel a sense of social 
isolation, copyists rarely experience any direct financial harm 
as a result of negative gossip.347 But occasionally, tattooers will 
make a more public stand against perceived copying.348
I cried in my bed for like three weeks and didn’t leave. I was devas-
tated. . . . [H]e said, “Boycott her tattooing. She doesn’t deserve to tat-
too. She’s a hack tattooer.” I mean, those are strong statements. Then, 
to go on his blog or whatever and see what [other] people wrote about 
me. I’m a girl. I’m sensitive. I fucking cried for weeks.
 One 
tattooer described her experience being publicly accused of cop-
ying in a widely read blog post: 
349
Although several tattooers recounted instances of confron-
tation, negative gossip, public shaming, and the like, many took 
a notably lax attitude toward the enforcement of industry 
norms.
 
350 Even when their own work was copied in a manner 
that violated community norms, they did little to pursue the 
copyist.351 This might suggest that tattoo industry norms are 
inconsistently enforced, or perhaps that the attitudes and prac-
tices in the industry are merely behavioral regularities and not 
norms at all. But for tattooers, like many other groups, norms 
are often identity constitutive.352 Violating industry norms not 
only runs the risk of community disapproval, it also under-
mines a tattooer’s self-conception.353
 
 344. See Interview with Subject 10, supra note 
 External enforcement ef-
8, at 102 (noting that a 
tattooer will be ostracized from the tattooer “circle” if he/she is found copying). 
 345. Id. with Subject 1 at 9. 
 346. See id. with Subject 2 at 23 (explaining that clients may not be aware, 
but within the industry, artists get blacklisted). 
 347. See id. with Subject 13 at 150 (describing the success of artists known 
for copying). 
 348. See id. with Subject 12 at 133. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See, e.g., id. with Subject 9 at 88 (discussing an instance when the 
subject’s work was copied). 
 351. See id. 
 352. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (challenging widely held understandings of “ra-
tionality, choice, and freedom,” and arguing that behavior is a function of 
norms). 
 353. See Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 109 (discussing his “in-
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forts may be less important when, as here, community mem-
bers have internalized norms.354
While most custom tattooers take seriously both communi-
ty disapproval and harms to self-conception, the norm against 
copying does not apply with the same force in street shops.
 
355 In 
many ways, the street shop stands as a holdover of the pre-
renaissance tattoo world. In terms of training, outlook, and so-
cioeconomics, street shop tattooers often share more in common 
with midcentury tattooers than contemporary custom 
tattooers.356 Whereas the custom tattoo community emphasizes 
artistry and originality, the street shop mentality focuses on 
speed, efficiency, and client turnover.357
These two environments inculcate very different sets of 
values.
  
358 Tattooers who learn their craft in a custom shop are 
taught to avoid copying.359 One tattooer explained that the “one 
moral thing [he] got out of [his apprenticeship], was that you 
just don’t copy anybody’s work.”360
[W]hen I first started tattooing I was at a street shop with real old 
salty guys. They had absolutely no problem ripping people off, at all, 
ruthlessly. To the point where I remember one of the guys that was 
teaching me to tattoo being like, “Well, if they didn’t put it on the In-
ternet, they wouldn’t want it stolen.”
 But a tattooer who started 
out at a street shop was exposed to a different set of values:  
361
As a result, literal and close copying of custom designs are 
more prevalent in street shops.
 
362 Tattooers with artistic aspira-
tions are less likely to copy.363
 
tegrity as a tattooer”).  
 “Anybody at a certain level isn’t 
going to try to copy. Only the guys at the bottom rung are going 
 354. Cooter’s claim that norms do not exist absent internalization is diffi-
cult to square with norm systems that appear to function primarily on the ba-
sis of external enforcement. See Cooter, supra note 11, at 1665. Nonetheless, 
both norm internalization and external sanctions can reinforce one another. 
See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 376–78, 381 (1997).  
 355. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 145. 
 356. See generally DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 97–135 (describing class 
and status distinctions within the tattoo community). 
 357. See Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 145 (“They’re just fuck-
ing banging shit out, it’s like, to get it done quick and efficiently.”). 
 358. See id. 
 359. See id. with Subject 10 at 97 (explaining that real artists of any medi-
um do not copy or trace). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. with Subject 12 at 135. 
 362. See id. at 135–36. 
 363. See id. with Subject 7 at 60. 
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to be willing to do that.”364 And tattooers who operate in the 
street shop environment are less responsive to the threat of 
negative gossip among custom tattooers.365 As one tattooer told 
me, “usually those scratchers don’t give a hoot about the moral-
ity, or any sort of industry consequences.”366 But for those who 
aspire to maintain or achieve a sense of belonging and recogni-
tion within the broader tattoo community, including many 
tattooers currently working in street shops, the anti-copying 
norm exerts significant influence.367
3. The Harms of Copying 
  
The variety of responses to violations of the anti-copying 
norm reflects the assortment of perceived harms tattooers asso-
ciate with copying. Some regard copying as a compliment;368 
others are concerned that copying injures their clients.369 For 
many tattooers, interests in attribution and artistic integrity 
are at the root of the norm against copying custom designs.370 
But tattooers also talk about the financial harms of copying, 
sometimes as a matter of competitive pricing, but more often in 
terms of free riding.371
Some tattooers subscribe to Charles Caleb Colton’s apho-
rism: “Imitation is the sincerest [form] of flattery.”
 The harms tattooers articulate, in turn, 
offer a window into the underlying explanations for both the 
content of tattoo industry norms and the more fundamental 
choice to forego formal legal enforcement. 
372 They see 
copies of their custom tattoos as recognition of the power and 
appeal of their designs.373 But for most tattooers, copying in-
flicts some combination of financial and dignitary harm.374
 
 364. Id. 
 
 365. See id. with Subject 12 at 135 (describing her experience at a street 
shop). 
 366. Id. with Subject 2 at 20. 
 367. See id. with Subject 12 at 135–36 (discussing her struggle to gain ac-
ceptance while working in a street shop). 
 368. Id. with Subject 8 at 70.  
 369. Id. with Subject 7 at 60. 
 370. See id. with Subject 11 at 114 (explaining that the greatest aspect of 
being a tattooer is being creative). 
 371. See id. with Subject 12 at 130 (saying “[t]hat’s the biggest thing, it’s 
just lazy”). 
 372. C. C. COLTON, LACON: OR, MANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS; ADDRESSED 
TO THOSE WHO THINK 113 (London et al. eds., 1820). 
 373. See Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 88. 
 374. See id. with Subject 12 at 134 (discussing a tattoo artist’s reaction to 
perceived copying). 
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Many object to copying for the same reason they refuse to reuse 
their own custom designs: clients have expectations of a 
unique, personal tattoo. Tattooers describe custom designs as 
imbued with “very personal sentiment,” an “express[ion of] . . . 
individuality,” or even something “sacred.”375
Tattooers see themselves as personally injured by copying 
as well.
 As a result, when 
a tattooer copies a custom design, it erodes the value of the cli-
ent’s one-of-a-kind tattoo. 
376 When their designs are copied, they are denied some 
measure of “notoriety,” “awareness,” or “respect” they would 
have otherwise derived from a successful tattoo.377 In the words 
of one tattooer, “I think the initial harm was somebody else get-
ting credit for something that I created. So someone else [was] 
receiving some sort of personal gain . . . socially.”378
The financial impact of copying is at the fore for many 
tattooers.
 This inter-
est in attribution is also evident in the complaints tattooers vo-
calize when images of tattoos they created are posted on the in-
ternet without credit. 
379 Because they charge hourly rates, the amount of 
cash in a tattooer’s pocket at the end of each day depends on 
the number of clients booked and the complexity of the tattoos 
executed.380 Worries over business lost to copyists, therefore, 
can be felt acutely.381 Many tattooers “are concerned about 
[copying] because they think it’s money being taken out of their 
mouth . . . because there’s a guy down the street now that 
might be tattooing and doing the same kind of style for, say, 
$20 less.”382 This risk of “underselling”—tattooing the same im-
agery at a lower price—explains why some tattooers take copy-
ing so seriously.383
 
 375. Id. with Subject 11 at 115; id. with Subject 7 at 62.  
  
 376. See id. with Subject 1 at 7 (explaining that copying is deeper than a 
personal financial issue; copying goes against tradition). 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. with Subject 11 at 114. 
 379. See id. with Subject 12 at 134 (discussing how the copyist will charge 
significantly less than the original tattooer, compromising the original 
tattooer’s profitability).  
 380. See id. with Subject 8 at 68 (discussing how payments by the hour 
work practically). 
 381. Id. at 73. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. with Subject 12 at 134. 
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Other tattooers, however, were dismissive of the notion of 
direct financial harm from copying.384 First, unless two 
tattooers operate in the same city, they rarely compete for the 
same clients.385 While some clients do travel to work with a pre-
ferred tattooer, most seek services close to home.386 Second, well 
established tattooers, whose designs are most likely to be cop-
ied, are often booked with a full slate of appointments many 
months in advance and therefore may not have the capacity to 
serve the copyist’s client.387
[People] view tattooers on these different tiers. They have these ideas 
of big name people and, “This person’s OK to rip off . . . .” because 
they assume that some guy’s booked a year ahead and it doesn’t affect 
him . . . . [T]he people who ripped me off were . . . less accomplished 
than me so they felt like that was justified. Like, “Oh, whatever, you 
work at this great shop. You’re a big name guy.” I’m like, No, I’m not. 
We probably pay the same amount of rent.
 But at least one tattooer rejected 
this rationalization, explaining: 
388
Despite disagreement over the magnitude of direct finan-
cial losses attributable to copying, the consensus among 
tattooers is that creating original designs entails significant 
opportunity costs.
 
389 Tattooers talked about the “hard earned 
time,” “struggle,” “effort,” and “guesswork” involved in design-
ing a custom tattoo.390 By tracing the results of another 
tattooer’s labor, the copyist is “just lazy.”391 In terms familiar to 
copyright law, the tracer merely sought “to avoid the drudgery 
in working up something fresh.”392
If it’s something that took me four hours to draw . . . they’re cutting 
out all that drawing time by just tracing an image of it. They’re not 
putting any effort, whereas I spent hard earned time that I wasn’t 
hanging out with my boyfriend or walking the dog because I was up 
all night working on this tattoo design that someone else copied.
 By free riding on the efforts 
and opportunity costs of their peers, tracers inflict perceived 
harms on other tattooers: 
393
 
 384. See id. at 135. 
  
 385. See Beasley, supra note 127, at 1172. 
 386. See Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 121 (discussing the 
rarity of client’s willingness to travel). 
 387. Cf. id. with Subject 13 at 139 (discussing that the copyist adversely 
affects the profit margins of the established tattooer). 
 388. Id. with Subject 3 at 34. 
 389. See id. with Subject 2 at 22 (explaining that much time and energy 
goes into the creation of a new tattoo). 
 390. Id. with Subject 2 at 21–22. 
 391. Id. with Subject 12 at 130. 
 392. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 393. Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21.  
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Although opinions differ on the harms copying imposes, the 
appropriate responses to those harms, and even the precise 
contours of impermissible copying, tattooers regard literal or 
close copying of custom tattoo designs as a clear violation of in-
dustry norms.394 In contrast, and as the next two sections dis-
cuss, tattooers agree that copying from other works of visual 
art is a standard and accepted practice within the industry.395
E. COPYING FLASH 
 
Pre-designed flash images, in contrast to custom tattoos, 
are copied freely within the tattoo industry, with the implicit 
understanding that those who acquire a copy of a flash design 
are entitled to reproduce it on as many clients as they choose.396 
However, the unstated rules surrounding flash impose some 
important limits on its use as well.397
For most of its history in the United States, flash served as 
the lifeblood of the tattoo industry.
 
398 Even after the dramatic 
rise of custom tattooing in recent decades, flash continues to 
play a major role in street shops.399 And more recently, the in-
dustry has witnessed a resurgence of traditional flash imagery 
among the more discerning clientele typically associated with 
higher end custom shops.400
Historically, tattoo shops acquired their collections of flash 
in a number of ways.
 
401 Young tattooers and apprentices were 
expected to draw new designs and contribute them to the 
shop.402 As one tattooer recounted, “If you were the new up and 
coming tattoo artist, you made flash that you gave to the owner 
and it sat in the shop. ‘Here is [sic] some designs I drew that I 
think everyone can do.’”403
 
 394. See id. at 22–23 (explaining that tattooists known for copying may be 
banned from conventions and shops). 
 Tattooers might also share flash de-
signs with one another or copy them from their clients’ bod-
 395. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12 at 137 (“Van Gogh can’t tattoo Starry 
Night on you but I can.”). 
 396. Id. with Subject 2 at 24. 
 397. See id. with Subject 3 at 29 (“[T]here’s also an unspoken thing . . . that 
you wouldn’t really do it the same.”). 
 398. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52–53. 
 399. Id. at 92. 
 400. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 63–64. 
 401. See id. at 63. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
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ies.404 Early on, tattooers like Lew Alberts recognized the poten-
tially lucrative market in flash designs and began selling 
sheets of tattoo designs to those not interested in or capable of 
drawing their own.405 Many shops were eager to pay for these 
images since the greater their stockpile of flash, the more ap-
pealing shops were to potential clients.406
Tattooers still produce flash today.
 
407 It is marketed and 
sold on the internet, through tattoo supply catalogs, and at tat-
too conventions across the country.408 A typical sheet of flash, as 
illustrated in Figure 5 below, contains five or six designs. A col-
lection of five to ten unique sheets of flash designs sells today 
from roughly $50 to $250.409 In addition to full-color renderings, 
contemporary flash is often packaged with separate line draw-
ings of each design to save tattooer the trouble of tracing out-
lines.410
 
 404. DEMELLO, supra note 
 
29, at 53. 
 405. Id. at 52. 
 406. See id. (stating that the early tattoo supply business was highly com-
petitive). 
 407. Id. at 92. 
 408. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 8. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. with Subject 6 at 50. 
Fig. 5 
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When Lew Alberts began selling sheets of flash at the turn 
of the twentieth century, he did not include an end user license 
agreement to define the permitted uses of his designs.411 Con-
temporary designers and retailers of flash are similarly silent 
on the question of precisely what rights are transferred when a 
tattooer purchases flash.412 While this failure to clearly articu-
late the scope of the license accompanying flash would strike 
professionals in many creative industries—and certainly their 
lawyers—as a troubling oversight, tattooers express no hesita-
tion about what the purchase of flash entails.413
They describe flash as meant “to be replicated.”
 
414 In their 
understanding, “if you purchase a set [of flash] . . . you now 
have purchased rights to tattoo these images should someone 
want them.”415 Purchasing flash entitles the tattooer to copy 
that design on as many customers as choose it.416 Ownership of 
flash also entitles the tattooer to make alterations to the origi-
nal design by adding, subtracting, or substituting elements or 
by altering the color palette.417 As one tattooer explained, “[y]ou 
do whatever you want to do with it. You can tattoo that on any-
body however you want to do it.”418
None of these rules are communicated in writing.
 
419 In fact, 
they are rarely even spoken.420 None of the tattooers I inter-
viewed could recall a conversation during which the rules sur-
rounding flash were explained to them.421 Instead, those rules 
are “sort of handed down and understood” through observation 
of daily industry practice.422
Copyright law would most likely consider the practices 




 411. See DEMELLO, supra note 
 An implied 
29, at 52 (stating that flash merely con-
tained the original artist’s signature). 
 412. Interview with Subject 5, supra note 8, at 43.  
 413. Id. with Subject 2 at 24. 
 414. Id. with Subject 10 at 101. 
 415. Id. with Subject 2 at 24. 
 416. Id. with Subject 1 at 11. 
 417. See id. at 10. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. with Subject 2 at 24. 
 420. Id. with Subject 5 at 43. 
 421. E.g., id. with Subject 8 at 77 (“I was never really told that, but I think 
that if you know that you’re walking into a tattoo shop and there are designs 
on the wall, you know that’s what it’s for.”). 
 422. Id. with Subject 2 at 24. 
 423. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:131 (2013). 
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license can arise when a work is created for and delivered to a 
licensee for a specified use, such as when an architect draws 
plans for a homeowner.424 More generally, a copyright owner 
may grant a nonexclusive license through conduct “from which 
[the] other [party] may properly infer that the owner consents 
to [his] . . . use.”425 Given the long history of flash and the estab-
lished expectations of both buyer and seller, a court would like-
ly treat the sale of flash as strong evidence of the intent neces-
sary for an implied license.426
But that license is limited in some notable respects.
 
427 Buy-
ing flash means that a tattooer is free to copy the design for the 
purposes of transferring it to a client’s skin.428 Copying it for 
other purposes—for example, to print t-shirts or competing 
sheets of flash bearing the design—would exceed the scope of 
the implied license from a legal perspective and, more im-
portantly, violate the industry norms surrounding flash: “If you 
buy [flash] from a guy and when he leaves town you color copy 
it and give it to everyone in town, he’s going to be pissed. ‘I sold 
it to you. You’re the only one who can use it.’ You don’t do 
that.”429
The treatment of flash provides a useful foil to the norms 
surrounding custom tattoo designs.
 
430
F. COPYING OTHER VISUAL ART 
 More importantly, it of-
fers a preview of the attitude toward other forms of visual art 
among tattooers. 
Unlike flash, which is created and marketed with the tat-
too market in mind, works of fine and commercial art are not 
sold to tattooers with the expectation that they will form the 
basis of tattoos.431
 
 424. Id. 
 Nonetheless, tattooers routinely copy works 
 425. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 
(1927). 
 426. Cf. 2 PATRY, supra note 423, § 5:131 (finding that courts require a 
“meeting of the minds”). 
 427. See Interview with Subject 10, supra note 8, at 101 (stating that a 
tattooer can use a flash to tattoo, but cannot “take it to kinko’s and color copy 
it and start selling it.”).  
 428. Id. 
 429. Id.  
 430. E.g., id. 
 431. Cf. id. with Subject 11 at 119–20 (describing the difference between 
tattoos and other visual arts). 
  
2013] TATTOO NORMS 561 
 
of visual art.432 Although at first glance this attitude may seem 
inconsistent with the strong norm against copying non-flash 
tattoo designs, the distinctions tattooers draw between copying 
within their industry and outside of it reveal a great deal about 
their conception of the underlying wrong copying represents.433
Every tattooer with whom I spoke had used a piece of fine 
or commercial art as the basis for a tattoo.
 
434 A few tattooers at 
high-end custom shops no longer reproduce other works of vis-
ual art for clients, but most continue to tattoo such images on 
occasion.435 Requests to tattoo paintings, photos, or illustrations 
are so common that some tattooers described them as serving 
the role traditional flash once played.436 Rather than choosing a 
pre-designed image off of the tattoo shop wall, many clients to-
day arrive at the shop with a pre-designed image located 
through Google.437 Tattooers frequently steer clients toward a 
custom design inspired by the reference material, whether to 
satisfy their own artistic impulse or ensure a better quality re-
sult for the client.438 But if a client insists on simply copying a 
reference, most tattooers will relent.439
The reluctance to copy works of visual art has little to do 
with any concern over the rights of the original artist.
 
440 In 
many ways, tattooers see any work other than a custom tattoo 
in much the same way they see flash—a design intended to be 
replicated, rather than created for a single use.441
 
 432. Id. with Subject 9 at 92. 
 Discussing 
tattoos of cartoon characters, one tattooer told me, “Disney de-
signs weren’t drawn for tattoos. [They are] icons . . . . Where as 
custom tattoo design, that was drawn for that human being. 
 433. See id. with Subject 7 at 62 (distinguishing between paintings or other 
illustrations and tattoers’ work). 
 434. E.g., id. with Subject 7 at 61–62; see generally id. (containing all inter-
view transcripts). 
 435. Compare id. with Subject 10 at 100 (explaining that only custom de-
signs are available), with id. with Subject 7 at 67 (noting that both custom and 
visual art reproductions are available). 
 436. Id. with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 28.  
 437. Interview with Subject 5, supra note 8, at 42. 
 438. E.g., id. with Subject 12 at 131 (explaining that tattooers do not want 
to be shown an image off the internet). 
 439. See id. with Subject 5, at 43 (stating that when the tattooer is pre-
sented with a picture, he will agree to do something similar to it). 
 440. See id. with Subject 6 at 52 (focusing on distinction between mediums 
as opposed to original artists rights). 
 441. See id. with Subject 11 at 120 (describing the acceptance that work 
will be appropriated when you become an artist). 
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It’s totally different.”442 Another tattooer used the same exam-
ple to illustrate what he saw as the natural consequence of me-
dia saturation, explaining: “[T]his is something that is pounded 
into our lives from an early age. Mickey Mouse. So how does so-
ciety . . . expect us not to take these images and make them our 
own . . . .”443
Aside from the sense that commercial art images are fair 
targets of reproduction, many tattooers are skeptical of the no-
tion that turning a painting, photograph, or illustration into a 
tattoo is merely an act of reproduction.
 
444 Interview subjects 
talked about the “interpretation” or “translation necessary in 
order to make a painting a tattoo.”445 They stressed that such a 
translation is “not a reproduction” or “just ripping off an image 
and photocopying it or [using] some [other] mechanical 
means.”446 In copyright terminology, they see their work as 
transformative.447
Tattooers were consistent in emphasizing the difference 
between human creation and mechanical reproduction.
  
448 Be-
cause of the inescapably manual process of creating a tattoo, an 
exact reproduction is impossible.449
I’m not a photocopier and this isn’t like painting on a wall where I can 
go and get these exact pigments and it’s got a white background so it 
doesn’t show up that way. It’s going to be seen through your skin, it’s 
going to age. I’ll do my best. I just let them know I’m not a fucking 
Xerox machine.
 And because of the medium 
of fixation, even the most skilled tattooer cannot literally copy 
another work of visual art: 
450
 
 442. Id. with Subject 1 at 12. 
  
 443. Id. with Subject 6 at 51. 
 444. Id. with Subject 6 at 51; Id. at 52. 
 445. Id. with Subject 2 at 25. 
 446. Id. with Subject 6 at 51. 
 447. The fair use doctrine permits otherwise infringing use of a protected 
work when the social benefit of a use outweighs the potential harm it presents 
to the copyright holder. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (noting 
that the fair use doctrine “permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid applica-
tion of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativ-
ity which that law is designed to foster” (citation omitted)). The fair use analy-
sis strongly favors uses of a work that “add something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, mean-
ing, or message . . . .” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994). 
 448. E.g., Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 151. 
 449. See id.; id. with Subject 9 at 92. 
 450. Id. with Subject 13 at 151. 
  
2013] TATTOO NORMS 563 
 
Given these inherent characteristics of the process, 
tattooers see themselves as adding something new even when 
they set out to faithfully translate a piece of visual art into a 
tattoo:  
[T]he skill of tattooing is refining something into a tattooable image. 
Tattoos are tattoos. Paintings are paintings. And you have to make 
one into the other . . . . An oil painting looks good because it’s . . . lay-
ered and has a certain sheen to it. It will never look like that on skin. 
But when you reinterpret it . . . it’s like developed a new meaning and 
developed a new power behind it.451
Whether a tattoo based on a piece of visual art would con-
stitute a fair use under copyright law is a difficult question to 
answer in the abstract.
 
452 But the rationale tattooers provide 
for this sort of copying is notable for how closely it echoes the 
Supreme Court’s definition of transformation as “altering the 
first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”453
A distinct justification for copying mirrors another element 
of the traditional fair use analysis. In the multifactor fair use 
analysis, courts consider the impact of the defendant’s use on 
the market for the original work.
 
454 To the extent the new work 
serves as a market substitute for the original, fair use is less 
likely.455 Because of the specialized technical skill necessary to 
execute even the simplest design, tattooers understand them-
selves as operating in completely different markets than paint-
ers, photographers, and illustrators.456 In other words, a tattoo 
is simply not a market substitute for other forms of visual 
art.457
 
 451. Id. with Subject 9 at 92. 
 When asked how she justified tattooing images created 
by visual artists, one tattooer responded, “Because that person 
is not a tattooer. They can’t do the tattoo for you. I can do the 
 452. Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (describing the tension between protect-
ing copyrighted material and the necessity of “borrowing” in art). 
 453. Id.at 579. 
 454. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (listing the fourth factor in Fair Use 
analysis as “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work”). 
 455. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that un-
der the fourth factor, the court’s “concern is not whether the secondary use 
suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential 
derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original 
work” (citation omitted)).  
 456. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 62. 
 457. See id. (“[A painter] can’t tattoo anyways, and so his work is fair game 
. . . .”). 
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tattoo for you . . . . Van Gogh can’t tattoo Starry Might [sic] on 
you but I can.”458
Relatedly, some tattooers explain why the norm against 
copying does not extend to visual artists in simple terms of 
group identity.
 
459 Those within the tattoo industry benefit from 
its norms; those outside of it do not.460 Tattooers regard other 
visual artists as a “completely separate community.”461 
Tattooers owe some obligation to each other, or at the very 
least face consequences within their community for running 
afoul of its norms.462 But since they see themselves as a coun-
tercultural group existing largely outside of the traditional art 
world, tattooers are especially unlikely to extend the same 
courtesies to artists they view as operating within the main-
stream.463 As one tattooer told me, “[W]hen it’s a painting or an 
illustration, it’s not another tattooer’s work. So in that sense, 
it’s not another pirate you may run across one day. It’s a 
square, a regular artist.”464
The near total absence of efforts by copyright holders to 
target tattooers for reproducing works of visual art likely rein-
forces this norm.
 
465 Tattooers reject the possibility that their 
use of works of visual art could expose them to copyright liabil-
ity as remote.466 That assessment appears to be warranted. A 
single unreported case, dismissed for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, addresses allegations that a tattoo infringes another copy-
righted work.467
 
 458. Id. with Subject 12 at 137. Indeed, many tattooers argue that rather 
than causing market harm, they are bringing valuable exposure and attention 
to the original artist. They see tattoos as a “form of flattery” or “advertising.” 
Id. with Subject 8 at 75. Some tattooers discussed the use of their own works 
of fine art as the basis for tattoos. They were flattered, thought it was “cool,” 
or at worst saw it as “not a big deal.” Id. with Subject 7 at 60; id. with Subject 
9 at 89; id. with Subject 1 at 5. 
 There, the author of a short literary work enti-
tled “Laundry Money” sued rapper Soulja Boy for his allegedly 
 459. See id. with Subject 11 at 120–21. 
 460. See id. at 121. 
 461. Id. 
 462. See id. with Subject 2 at 22 (describing the consequences of breaking 
norms in the tattoo community). 
 463. See id. with Subject 12 at 138 (“[W]e don’t want to be part of main-
stream society.”). 
 464. Id. with Subject 7 at 62. 
 465. See id. with Subject 3 at 41 (suggesting that tattoo artists would take 
copying more seriously if they were sued). 
 466. See, e.g., id. with Subject 11 at 119. 
 467. Brown v. Way, No. 10-13016, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87362, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 5, 2011). 
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infringing tattoo.468 Although none of my interview subjects had 
heard of that case, several recounted a widespread story within 
the industry concerning lawsuits reportedly filed by the Walt 
Disney Company against George Reiger, the “Disney Tattoo 
Guy.”469 Reiger, an avid Disney fan, has reportedly covered 87% 
of his body in tattoos depicting various Disney characters.470 
Despite the common wisdom within the tattoo industry, howev-
er, Disney has neither sued nor threatened to sue Reiger for his 
collection.471
Rights holders, particularly large ones like Disney, are 
likely aware of the use of their works within the tattoo indus-
try.
 This suggests that tattooers may, in fact, overes-
timate the practical risk of copyright liability. 
472 The absence of enforcement against tattooers and their 
clients is therefore probably not the result of a mere lapse in 
policing.473 Instead, it appears to be a deliberate choice to forego 
enforcement efforts.474 Identifying instances of infringement 
poses practical difficulties, but rights holders have targeted 
other small businesses that present similar practical hurdles to 
enforcement.475
But there are at least two reasons rights holders might 
treat tattooers differently from other small businesses that en-
gage in occasional infringement. First, tattoos are an expres-
 
 
 468. Id. 
 469. Mark Eades, Disney Tattoo Guy: Removing Tattoos for Love, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG., Nov. 18, 2010, http://ocresort.ocregister.com/2010/11/18/disney 
-tattoo-guy-removing-tattoos-for-love/61876/. 
 470. Interviews: The Disney Tattoo Guy, B3TA, http://www.b3ta.com/ 
interview/disney/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 471. Id. (“No comment from [Disney] it’s a catch 22 situation. They allow 
me to have the tattoos, but won’t publically back me because they don’t want 
anyone else [to] have similar tattoos”). 
 472. See id. In addition to copyright claims, rights holders would likely 
bring claims for trademark infringement against tattooers. This Article will 
not assess the merits of those claims other than to remind the reader that the 
relevant standard is the likelihood of consumer confusion as to source or spon-
sorship of the allegedly infringing good or service. 
 473. See id. 
 474. See id. (noting that Disney gets “a lot of free advertising”). 
 475. Jennifer Delson, Got a License for the Pinata?, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/19/local/me-pinata19 (noting in-
fringement lawsuits filed by Disney against vendors of unlicensed piñatas); 
Peter Elkind, Stop Copying That Mickey, or We’ll Shoot! Why You Can’t Have 
Your Cartoon-Character Cake and Eat It Too, FORTUNE, Dec. 29, 1997, http:// 
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1997/12/29/235894/index 
.htm (noting Disney’s efforts, usually in the form of cease-and-desist letters, 
targeting bakeries selling unlicensed birthday cakes). 
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sion of a deep commitment to the underlying work.476 A Harry 
Potter birthday cake is the sign of a casual fan; a Harry Potter 
tattoo is the mark of a lifelong devotee.477 The same is true of 
the sports team and band logo tattoos that are a staple at many 
street shops. Rights holders may be reluctant to discourage 
such expressions of zealotry for fear of alienating those con-
sumers who are presumably most likely to stand in line with 
cash in hand to purchase sequels, spinoffs, and licensed mer-
chandise.478
Second, although copyright holders have shown a willing-
ness to license authorized apparel, birthday cakes, and even 
piñatas,
 
479 we have yet to see a line of Disney-licensed tattoo 
flash designs.480 Given the negative associations tattoos still 
conjure in many segments of society, the tattoo market is not 
one we should expect many rights holders to enter in the near 
future.481 And because rights holders have opted out of this 
market, unlicensed tattoos give rise to no measurable economic 
harm.482
This policy of benign neglect, coupled with the refusal of 
tattooers to avail themselves of legal process, means that copy-
ing within the tattoo industry is governed entirely by internal 
industry norms.
 With those two factors in mind, it is hardly surprising 




 476. See Interviews: The Disney Tattoo Guy, supra note 
 As this Part has described, those norms re-
470. 
 477. See id. 
 478. Rights holders are not uniform in their response to potential in-
fringement by dedicated fans, sometimes tolerating or even encouraging such 
behavior and at other times suppressing it. See Steven A. Hetcher, Using So-
cial Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1869, 1887–91 (2009) (describing the competing strategies of rights holders in 
response to fan creation). 
 479. See supra note 475 and accompanying text. 
 480. See Interviews: The Disney Tattoo Guy, supra note 470. 
 481. Cf. People With Tattoos Are Perceived to be Less Credible than Those 
Without, EXAMINER, Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/article.people 
-with-tattoos-are-perceived-to-be-less-credible-than-those-without (summariz-
ing research on perceptions of people with tattoos). For similar reasons, the 
use of works of visual art as templates for tattoos can lay a strong claim to fair 
use under the fourth factor. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 592 (1994) (limiting derivative markets to those the copyright owner 
“would in general develop or license others to develop”). 
 482. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (focusing on the market of the rights hold-
er). 
 483. E.g., Interview with Subject 5, supra note 8, at 43 (explaining that 
everyone “that gives a shit” shares the industry’s understanding). 
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spect client autonomy in the creation and use of tattoos, dis-
courage duplication of custom tattoo designs by both the origi-
nal tattooer and copyists, and generally treat flash designs and 
works of visual art as freely available raw material for tattoos. 
The next Part moves from describing these norms to explaining 
them.  
III.  EXPLAINING TATTOO NORMS   
This Part begins by addressing two related questions. 
First, why have tattooers developed the particular set of infor-
mal norms described above? Second, and more fundamentally, 
why did they develop any system of norms rather than rely on 
the existing formal structure of copyright law? No single narra-
tive fully explains these developments. Instead, the best expla-
nation attributes the emergence of tattoo industry norms to the 
confluence of complementary cultural and economic forces.484 As 
a community, tattooers share a deep skepticism of the legal 
system.485 And as an informal guild, tattooers share a collective 
economic interest in both preserving market demand for their 
services and restraining entry by new competitors.486
Remarkably, the contours of formal law appear to play no 
appreciable role in the development of IP norms in the tattoo 
industry.
  
487 In their study of French chefs, Fauchart & von 
Hippel conclude that “inadequate or unsatisfactory” existing in-
tellectual property protections are among the key “conditions 
favorable to norm-based IP systems.”488 Studies of other crea-
tive communities have likewise ascribed some causal weight to 
the unavailability of meaningful formal legal protection.489
 
 484. See generally id. with all Subjects (providing insight into tattoo artist 
culture). 
  
 485. See id. with Subject 1 at 15–16 (stating that using the legal system 
would be too costly, but also would be an “overdone” remedy for such “a small 
scale thing”). 
 486. Cf. Workers in the Informal Economy, WORLD BANK, http://web 
.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/ 
EXTLM/0,,contentMDK:20224904~menuPK:584866~pagePK:148956~piPK: 
216618~theSitePK:390615,00.html#papers (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (describ-
ing the importance of market pressures in less regulated areas). 
 487. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 40 (having never 
registered a tattoo image created). 
 488. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 12, at 199. 
 489. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1789–90 (“The absence of 
lawsuits [between rival comedians] is not terribly surprising . . . . [C]opyright 
law does not provide comedians with a cost effective way of protecting the es-
sence of their creativity.”); see also Loshin, supra note 12, at 130–34 (describ-
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But tattooers are not motivated to create, maintain, and 
enforce norms because of substantive barriers to legal protec-
tion.490 As discussed above, tattoo designs, whether fixed on pa-
per or on human skin, are works embraced by copyright.491 And 
while some tattoo industry norms—most notably, those dealing 
with what copyright lawyers would call questions of initial 
ownership—materially differ from the outcomes dictated by 
formal law, there is no evidence to suggest any appreciation 
within the tattoo community of the finer points of the works-
made-for—hire or joint-authorship doctrines.492 Tattooers do 
not rely on norms as a second-best alternative to a legal system 
that denies them protection or leads to substantive outcomes 
that they reject.493 As discussed below, tattooers express skepti-
cism about the legal system, but their attitude toward law is 
best described as indifferent as a matter of day-to-day prac-
tice.494
This relationship between formal law and tattoo industry 
norms provides some confirmation of the dynamics within the 
roller derby subculture described by Fagundes.
 
495 There, despite 
the availability of trademark protection, athletes developed an 
elaborate set of rules and procedures for claiming pseudo-
nyms.496 Although Fagundes attributes the emergence of those 
naming norms to the community’s emphasis on group identity 
and volunteerism, tattoo industry norms help to confirm a more 
generalizable principle.497
Aside from doctrinal hurdles to protection, practical barri-
ers to effective enforcement could influence reliance on norms. 
Chief among those barriers is cost. Although obtaining copy-




ing the inadequacy of copyright, patent, and trade secret doctrines from the 
perspective of magicians).  
 enforcement is an 
 490. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 12 (stating that tattoos 
are different from something you would copyright or patent). 
 491. See supra Part I.A. 
 492. The evidence suggests the opposite. See Munster, supra note 192. 
 493. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 14–15. 
 494. See id. 
 495. See Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1097. 
 496. Id. at 1115–21. 
 497. Id. at 1140–43. 
 498. Copyright protection subsists from the moment an original work is 
fixed. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). Registration, though a statutory prerequisite 
for filing suit, is not required to establish a copyright interest. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 408, 504 (2012). The online registration fee for a basic claim in an original 
work begins at thirty-five dollars. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www 
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expensive proposition.499 A few tattooers mentioned the cost of 
legal enforcement as one reason among many they would avoid 
judicial process. One suggested that it would require “George 
Lucas money” to “go around suing everybody and have a fleet of 
people online 24/7 looking for copyright infringement.”500 The 
market value of any particular work is unlikely to justify such 
expenses.501 But the same is true for most non-institutional 
copyright owners.502 Painters, photographers, and poets all face 
similar economic obstacles to enforcement of their statutory 
rights, and yet we do not generally consider them to be operat-
ing outside of the basic framework of copyright law as a re-
sult.503 Indeed copyright law anticipates the risk of 
underenforcement by allowing recovery of statutory awards far 
in excess of actual damages and attorney’s fees.504
Rather than substantive or practical, the most important 
barrier to legal enforcement within the tattoo industry is cul-
tural.  
  
A. TATTOO CULTURE 
Most tattooers expressed some degree of skepticism about 
the law, the judicial system, or the notion of leveraging that 
system to assert their rights.505
 
.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).  
 Misgivings about litigation are 
not uncommon in society at large, but there are at least two 
 499. The average cost of copyright litigation ranges from $216,000 to pro-
ceed through discovery when less than one million dollars is in controversy to 
two million dollars to proceed though trial when more than twenty-five million 
dollars is at stake. Steven M. Auvil & David A. Divine, Report of the Economic 
Survey, AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, July, 2011, at 31. 
 500. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 149; see also Beasley, su-
pra note 127, at 1158. 
 501. Cf. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 15 (claiming that legal 
action would not be affordable given the little money being made from a par-
ticular design). 
 502. In theory, the notice and takedown provisions introduced by the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act drastically reduced enforcements costs for au-
thors whose works are reproduced online. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 503. Of course, some of these creative communities may well have dis-
placed formal law through their own sets of norms. The absence of any in-
formed sense of how creators within these fields operate reveals the degree to 
which IP law rests on assumptions about creative production instead of a 
foundation of empirical evidence. 
 504. See 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 505. Other studies of creative communities governed by norms have noted 
similar antipathy toward the law. See Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1137 (de-
scribing the relationship between roller derby names and national and inter-
national trademark regulations). 
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reasons to suspect that tattooers as a group are more inclined 
toward skepticism of the legal process. First, tattooers embrace 
and celebrate their status as outsiders who operate without re-
gard to established social conventions.506 Second, tattooers and 
their industry have endured a history of targeted enforcement 
of regulations that effectively prohibited their trade in neigh-
borhoods, cities, and entire states.507
Tattooers describe contemporary American culture as gen-
erally “too litigious” and “lawsuit happy.”
 
508 And they express 
distrust in the ability of the judicial system to arrive at fair 
outcomes. “[T]he results of the legal system,” one interview sub-
ject told me, “have little to do with what’s right or wrong. I 
think anyone with half a brain can see that.”509
Some tattooers are particularly dismissive of what they see 
as the rise of intellectual property lawsuits in recent years. One 
tattooer told me such disputes are “really silly. It[’s] basically 
just a society on it’s [sic] way down and we’re tur[n]ing on each 
other and suing each other. It’s petty, and it’s bullshit.”
 
510 With-
in the tattoo industry, hiring a lawyer or filing a lawsuit to as-
sert intellectual property rights suggests an “inflated ego” or 
confirms your status as a “prima donna” or simply “a dick.”511
Because of the outsider mentality many tattooers share, 
they appear to be predisposed to skepticism about the law.
 
512 
They talk about tattooing existing on the periphery of “respect-
able society” and operating within a framework that does not 
“conform to normalcy.”513 Despite the recent popularity of tat-
toos, the act of covering the majority of one’s body with tattoos 
remains a conscious rejection of prevailing social conventions.514
 
 506. Interview with Subject 11, supra note 
 
8, at 122. 
 507. See, e.g., Govenar, supra note 50, at 228–29 (discussing age regula-
tions imposed on the tattoo industry as a result of health and sanitation con-
cerns). 
 508. Interview with Subject 10, supra note 8, at 98; id. with Subject 13 at 
143.  
 509. Id. with Subject 6 at 55. 
 510. Id. at 50. 
 511. Id. with Subject 8 at 79; id. with Subject 12 at 138; id. with Subject 13 
at 143. 
 512. Id. with Subject 11 at 122. 
 513. Id. 
 514. But cf. Brendan O’Neill, Tattoos Were Once a Sign of Rebellion—Now 
They Are Evidence of Craven Conformity to Cultural Norms, THE TELEGRAPH, 
Aug. 9, 2012, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/brendanoneill2/100175760/ 
tattoos-were-once-a-sign-of-rebellion-now-they-are-evidence-of-an-individuals 
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Regardless of whether tattooing breeds this outsider attitude or 
it results instead from self-selection, tattooers see themselves 
as standing apart from mainstream society, even as their work 
gains a foothold in it. As one tattooer described his compatriots, 
“We’re pirates. This is a fringe art form, no matter what they 
want to say. It’s not a regular square job. It’s not a normal way 
to make a living.”515 Their position at the margins is tied to a 
sense of detachment from established mechanisms of social 
control, which in turn reinforces a preference for self-
governance. One tattooer’s response to a hypothetical peer who 
turned to formal law to resolve a dispute over copying sums up 
this attitude: “We govern ourselves. . . . So step off your high 
horse and un-hire your lawyer.”516
In addition to its countercultural spirit of independence, 
the tattoo industry rejects formal law out of a shared sense of 
history.
 
517 Although the biker and ex-convict contingent of the 
tattoo community has been largely displaced by generations of 
tattooers with clean criminal records, many within the industry 
continue to see the legal system as a threatening presence: 
“[C]oming from the time I started, there [were] a lot of people 
engaged in a lot of illegal activities. . . . [A] lot of people [in the 
tattoo industry] are always going to have a problem with any 
kind of law enforcement or authority like that.”518 Even for 
tattooers whose run-ins with the law are limited to the occa-
sional parking ticket, the history of regulation and criminaliza-
tion of the tattoo industry colors their perception of the legal 
system.519
Public health concerns over unsanitary conditions in many 
tattoo shops provided the original impetus for laws regulating 
the industry in the mid-twentieth century. In the 1940s, state 
and local authorities began to impose minimum age require-





-craven-conformity-to-cultural-norms/ (arguing that getting tattoos is no long-
er a rejection of social norms). 
 After the 1959 death of a recently tattooed client from 
 515. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 64. 
 516. Id. with Subject 12 at 138. 
 517. See, e.g., id. with Subject 8 at 79 (describing why many tattooers have 
a problem trusting law enforcement). 
 518. Id. with Subject 8 at 79. 
 519. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 94–95 (observing that tattooers are 
suspicious of the legal system as a result of harassment by local lawmakers 
and law enforcement officials). 
 520. Govenar, supra note 50, at 228–29. 
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hepatitis,521 New York City, Nassau, and Suffolk counties 
banned tattooing altogether.522 Criminal bans by state and local 
governments across the country followed, including cities in 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Virginia.523 While 
some of these early bans may have been a justifiable response 
to a threat to public health, the tattoo industry long ago 
demonstrated its ability to ensure a safe, hygienic environment 
for clients.524 Nonetheless, tattooing remained illegal in New 
York City until 1997525 and was not legalized in South Carolina 
and Oklahoma until 2004 and 2006 respectively.526
Even in the absence of statewide prohibitions, tattooers are 
still subject to local bans and restrictive zoning ordinances that 
place tattoo shops on par with strip clubs and pawn shops.
 
527 
South Carolina, for example, requires proof that a local zoning 
ordinance explicitly identifies tattoo shops as a permitted use 
before its health department will issue the required license.528
Tattooers have challenged various state and local re-




 521. In the early 1940s, tattooer Harry Lawson unsuccessfully sought to 
prevent such outbreaks by advocating for regulating hygiene in tattoo shops. 
Id. at 226. 
 One 
of the first courts to hear such a challenge described “the deco-
ration, so called, of the human body by tattoo designs” as “a 
barbaric survival, often associated with a morbid or abnormal 
personality” and noted “one-third of the admissions to the U. S. 
 522. Id. at 232; Thomas J. Lueck, On the Tattoo Map, It’s the Sticks: New 
York Plays Catch-Up at First Skin Art Convention, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1998, 
at B1. 
 523. Govenar, supra note 50, at 232. 
 524. See Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980) (de-
scribing sterilization procedures used by tattooers). 
 525. Lueck, supra note 522. 
 526. Governor Set to Ink Bill Legalizing Tattoo Trade in Oklahoma, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CENTER. (May 6, 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
governor-set-to-ink-bill-legalizing-tattoo-trade-in-oklahoma. 
 527. See Gary Nelson, State High Court Hears Mesa Tattoo Zoning Case, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.usatoday30.usatoday..com/USCP/PNI/ 
Valley%20&%20State/2012-03-28-PNI0328met-tattoocasePNIBrd_ST_U.htm; 
Adam Townsend, Tattoo Parlors Slated for Prohibition in Downtown S.C., SAN 
CLEMENTE PATCH (May 20, 2011), http://sanclemente.patch.com/groups/ 
business-new/s/p/tattoo-parlors-slated-for-prohibition-in-downtown-sc. 
 528. See Zoning Requirements for Tattoo Facilities, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& ENVTL. CONTROL, http://www.scdhec.gov/health/licen/hltattoozoning.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 529. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 496 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980); Grossman v. 
Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345 (1966). 
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Public Health Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, for drug addic-
tion were tattooed. If the addict was also a sexual deviant, the 
incidence of tattooing was markedly higher.”530
Courts considering First Amendment challenges to re-
strictions on tattooing have taken one of three approaches.
 
531 
Most courts have held that tattooing is neither speech nor ex-
pressive conduct and thus not entitled to First Amendment 
protection.532 Others treat tattooing as conduct rather than 
pure speech but acknowledge that it is imbued with expressive 
purpose and therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny.533 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit struck down a ban on tattoo 
shops in Hermosa Beach, holding that “tattooing is purely ex-
pressive activity rather than conduct expressive of an idea.”534 
Like the processes of writing, painting, or playing an instru-
ment, the court recognized that “the entire purpose of tattooing 
is to produce the tattoo,” an expressive work squarely within 
the protections of the First Amendment.535
The Ninth Circuit’s decision, while marking a notable de-




 530. Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338, 338 n.1 (App. Div. 
1964), aff’d, 17 N.E.2d 345 (1966) (holding that a New York City Health Code 
provision banning tattooing except when performed by a licensed physician 
was a constitutional exercise of police power). 
 still 
reflected hints of the hostility that marred earlier opinions. In a 
 531. See Ryan J. Walsh, Painting on a Canvas of Skin: Tattooing and the 
First Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 1075–82 (2011) (describing the var-
ious approaches courts have adopted to analyzing tattooing under the First 
Amendment). 
 532. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 
2d 656, 659–60 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that “the act of tattooing is not consti-
tutionally-protected free speech” because it is conduct that lacks an “intent to 
convey a particularized message”); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 
1253 (D. Minn. 1980) (“Wherever the amorphous line of demarcation exists 
between protected and unprotected conduct for First Amendment purposes, 
the Court is convinced that tattooing falls on the unprotected side of the 
line.”); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2002) (“Unlike burning the flag, 
the process of injecting dye to create the tattoo is not sufficiently communica-
tive to warrant protections and outweigh the risks to public safety.”). 
 533. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Meuse, No. 9877CR2644, 1999 WL 
1203793, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 29, 1999). 
 534. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 
2010); see also Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 869 (Ariz. 2012) (adopt-
ing the rule from Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach and holding that tattoo-
ing is protected by the First Amendment). 
 535. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062. 
 536. In rejecting the separation between an expressive work and the pro-
cess that created it, the court favorably compared tattoos to both the Declara-
tion of Independence and the Sistine Chapel. Id. 
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begrudging concurrence Judge Noonan conceded that the court 
was “bound to protect the First Amendment value at issue” but 
insisted that it was “not bound to recognize any special aesthet-
ic, literary, or political value in the tattooist’s toil and trade.”537
Tattooers have been subject to unforgiving and frequently 
unconstitutional regulations of both their profession and their 
speech for more than sixty years.
 
538 In light of this history, their 
reluctance to turn to the judicial system to vindicate their in-
terests in their expressive works is understandable.539 But 
tattooers are troubled by the notion of inviting judicial scrutiny 
for another reason.540 They worry that the introduction of for-
mal law into the tattoo industry will open the door to a range of 
unintended consequences.541
If you want to [pursue legal action], that’s fine. But I don’t want to 
hear any pissing and moaning when you have to fill out contracts for 
every fucking person you tattoo. Stuff like that, there’s going to be a 
ripple effect from it. It’s just getting the government more involved—
or any legal body more involved—in something that we’ve had a lot of 
freedom with and everyone’s enjoyed.
 As one tattooer explained: 
542
Aside from the costs of formalizing the tattooer-client rela-
tionship, tattooers might reasonably worry that asserting copy-
right interests in their own creations might attract unwanted 
attention from the many copyright holders in the broader art 
world whose works are routinely copied by tattooers. By resolv-
ing their internal disputes through informal means, tattooers 
reinforce the notion that their creations are somehow apart 




Taken together, these cultural features of the tattoo indus-
try—its deeply engrained sense of nonconformity and its histor-
ically strained relationship with the law—provide an explana-
tion for the emergence of industry norms that might be 
sufficient, but is far from complete. Tattooers, though they val-
ue creativity, innovation, and independence, are fundamentally 
 
 
 537. Id. at 1069 (Noonan, J. concurring). 
 538. See generally Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1061 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345 (1966). 
 539. See generally Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 79 (describing 
why many tattooers have a problem trusting law enforcement).  
 540. Id. at 156. 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id.  
 543. See id. with Subject 6 at 55 (explaining that to take legal action 
against someone who copies your tattoo requires a focus on money that many 
tattooers lack). 
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market actors. Any account of the development of tattoo indus-
try norms has to consider the economics of contemporary tat-
tooing.544
B. TATTOO ECONOMICS 
  
The economics of the tattoo industry differ from those of 
traditional copyright-reliant industries in important ways. The 
publishing, music, and film industries make money by creating 
original works and offering them to the public545 . Sometimes 
the work is distributed in copies; sometimes it is performed or 
displayed publicly.546 In either case, the goal is to attract as 
many paying readers, listeners, or viewers as possible—in 
short, to have a hit.547 Broad public access, conditioned on some 
form of payment, is at the heart of these business models.548
Very little of what happens in the tattoo industry follows 
this basic framework.
 
549 Commercial flash artists, who generate 
tattoo designs and sell copies through industry publications 
and internet sites, fit easily within the reproduction-and-sale 
business model.550 But the street shops where those designs are 
transferred to clients do not.551 Few of the flash designs in any 
street shop are generated in-house.552
 
 544. See infra Part III.B. 
 So while street shops are 
in the business of serial-reproduction of copyrighted works, 
they are more analogous to the local copy shop than the local 
 545. See, e.g., Kanye West Announces “The Yeezus Tour,” BILLBOARD (Sept. 
6, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/the-juice/ 
5687102/kanye-west-announces-the-yeezus-tour (reporting that Kanye West’s 
original album “Yeezus” sold 327,000 copies in the first week after release). 
 546. See id. (announcing that Kanye West will perform his original album 
“Yeezus” during his upcoming concert tour). 
 547. Cf. Mark F. Schultz, Fear & Norms & Rock & Roll: What Jam Bands 
Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 651, 657 (2006) (arguing that the music industry needs more than 
mere “one-hit wonders” to stay financially viable in the age of copying). 
 548. Cf. KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF 
ECONOMY 6 (2012) (noting that copyright laws enable industries, such as pub-
lishing, music and film, to have control over copying in order to encourage in-
novation); id. (noting that illegal copying is dismantling the music industry’s 
old business model). 
 549. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 56 (noting an in-
trinsic difference between other art forms and tattooing). 
 550. See id. with Subject 1 at 10–11 (describing flash tattoo sales). 
 551. Id. (noting that buying flash enables a tattooer to make as many cop-
ies as they want). 
 552. Id.; id. with Subject 2 at 24. 
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book publisher.553 They make their income by offering copying 
services, not by selling or licensing copies of their original 
works.554
The custom tattoo shop is even further removed from pre-
vailing copyright-reliant business models.
 
555 Custom tattooing 
developed as the result of the feedback loop between tattooers 
seeking greater opportunity for creative freedom and clients 
looking for unique and original designs.556 After decades of cus-
tom tattoos and a recent flood of tattoo-centric reality television 
programming, custom designs are a firmly established expecta-
tion among clients.557 “The consciousness of the tattoo commu-
nity and the client is so much higher than it used to be ten 
years ago,” one tattooer told me. “Now everybody wants a cus-
tom tattoo.”558 Another explained that because “we live in such 
a custom tattoo time, anyone that emails you about a tattoo as-
sumes that you’re going to draw something for them. . . . [Cli-
ents] want to make the monkey dance.”559
Because of the emphasis clients place on bespoke tattoos, 
the custom tattoo market is far more circumspect when it 
comes to copying than traditional copyright-reliant indus-
tries.
 
560 For those industries, the value of the work is propor-
tional to its reproduction.561
 
 553. Because shops that rely on flash are likely operating under implied 
license, they are largely insulated from liability. 
 In order to harness that value, ex-
clusive rights limit reproduction to the copyright holder or its 
 554. See Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 67 (describing the work 
of a street shop tattooer as a “service”). 
 555. See, e.g., id. with Subject 2 at 24 (noting that custom shops keep hard-
ly any flash). 
 556. See, e.g., id. with Subject 6 at 54 (discussing the recent trend in the 
tattoo industry toward custom designs). 
 557. See, e.g., Angel Cohn, Best Ink: Will This Be a Stain on Oxygen’s Per-
manent Record?, TELEVISION WITHOUT PITY (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www 
.televisionwithoutpity.com/telefile/2012/03/best-ink-will-this-go-down-in.php 
(noting two tattoo-based competition shows airing on the Oxygen and Spike 
networks); 'Tattoo School' Reality Series Coming to TLC, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/03/tattoo-school-tlc_n_ 
1475235.html (noting that four tattoo-related reality shows have aired on TLC 
alone).  
 558. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 61.  
 559. Id. with Subject 3 at 30. 
 560. Id. with Subject 10 at 97 (“I don’t replicate any of my drawings on an-
ybody else.”). 
 561. Id. with Subject 8 at 75 (“A logo, for example, is in some sense made to 
be reproduced . . . . You’re going to put it on as many things as you can con-
vince people to buy.”). 
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licensees.562 But a custom tattoo derives its value largely from 
the fact that it will not be reproduced, even by the tattooer who 
created it. Reproduction is not limited to the rights holder; it is 
precluded altogether.563
1. Norms as Collective Self-Interest 
 As described below, the tattoo indus-
try’s recognition of client demands for unique designs helps ex-
plain the development of its norms. 
The classic Demsetzian analysis predicts that formal or in-
formal property rights emerge when their benefits outweigh 
their costs, either because the value of exclusivity increases or 
the cost of enforcement drops.564 The tattoo industry presents a 
narrative that fits reasonably well within this model. As client 
demand for custom tattoos increased, so did the harm tattooers 
felt from appropriation of their designs.565 And as technology fa-
cilitated both the detection of copying and the spread of nega-
tive gossip within the geographically dispersed tattoo commu-
nity, enforcement costs plummeted.566
This story tells us why tattooers would be motivated to as-
sert a claim, either formal or informal, against copyists.
 
567 But 
it doesn’t explain why tattooers have opted consistently for in-
formal social norms rather than the formal property-like rules 
of copyright law.568 So while it’s easy to see why a tattooer 
would seek to protect his own work against copying, his com-
mitment to enforcing norms when the work of another member 
of the community is copied is not captured by the Demsetzian 
model.569
 
 562. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 
 
548, at 6 (“Innovation re-
quires rules that allow creators to control who can make copies—either by 
making copies themselves, or selling licenses to others. Creators, in short, 
need a monopoly over the right to make copies.”). 
 563. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 16 (asserting that 
the tattooer would not exactly replicate their own tattoo design). 
 564. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 350 (1967) (arguing that property rights arise in response to chang-
es in the costs and benefits of using and protecting resources). 
 565. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21–22 (describing the 
financial harm of having someone copy your tattoo). 
 566. See id. at 22–23 (discussing technology-related ways that people be-
come blacklisted by the tattoo community for copying). 
 567. See, e.g., id. with Subject 6 at 50 (asserting that people who seek legal 
recourse for copied designs are after money). 
 568. Id. with Subject 9 at 94 (claiming that hiring a lawyer to respond to 
copied material is “ridiculous”). 
 569. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Who’s in the Club: A Response to Oliar 
and Sprigman, 95 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 1, 4–5 (2009) (noting the need for an 
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Propertization alone doesn’t explain tattoo industry norms 
because they arise out of collective rather than personal inter-
ests. Robert Ellickson, in his foundational study of Shasta 
County ranchers, suggested that informal norms take root 
when three conditions are satisfied: the relevant community is 
close knit, the norms govern workaday affairs, and the norms 
enhance the collective welfare of the community.570
Ellickson defined a close knit community as “a social net-
work whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for 
the application of power against one another and a good supply 
of information on past and present internal events.”
 Each of the-
se three requirements is met in the tattoo industry.  
571 Although 
it is geographically dispersed, the tattoo industry bears the 
hallmarks of a close-knit community. Indeed, more than one in-
terview subject used that precise language to describe their in-
dustry.572 Through a combination of workplace gossip, conversa-
tions at regional and national tattoo conventions, and 
technology-mediated discussion, tattooers have created a de-
centralized network for the exchange of industry information, 
including accusations of copying.573 And as discussed above, 
that exchange of information carries profound social and pro-
fessional consequences for tattooers accused of transgressing 
community norms.574
The questions governed by tattoo industry norms are 
workaday issues, ones tattooers confront professionally on a 
daily basis: how to collaborate with clients; how to respond to 
client requests for tattoo designs that originate from flash, pri-
or custom work, or commercial art; and how to define their re-




analysis of why IP social norms develop to account for the “dual potential 
roles” of community members as both “creators” and “thieves”). 
 
 570. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SET-
TLE DISPUTES 167 (1991) (“[M]embers of a close knit-group develop and main-
tain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that 
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 571. Id. at 181. 
 572. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 8–9 (discussing the 
importance of being part of a tattoo community). 
 573. See id. at 9–10 (noting that the community hears about a copier 
online, through word of mouth, or at conventions). 
 574. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 575. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 18–19 (discussing 
the relationship between the rules against copying and client interactions on a 
daily basis). 
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Most importantly, tattoo norms enhance the welfare of the 
community.576 Ellickson understood welfare-maximizing norms 
as those that minimize both transaction costs and deadweight 
loss associated with unexploited trade.577 From a tattooer’s 
short-term perspective, defection from the norm against copy-
ing is an attractive strategy.578 By free riding on the efforts of 
another custom tattooer, she can avoid the opportunity cost as-
sociated with drawing up an original design, and because she is 
paid only for the hours spent tattooing, her compensation holds 
constant.579
But once client expectations are taken into account, those 
short-term strategies reveal themselves as collectively harm-
ful.
 Similar incentives could encourage a tattooer to vio-
late the norm favoring client autonomy. By extracting rents 
from a client whose public display or other use of the tattoo de-
velops economic value, the tattooer appears to benefit from a 
windfall. 
580 Clients expect unique tattoos, and they expect considera-
ble freedom to display and use the images on their bodies.581 
Tattooers who upset those settled expectations run the risk of 
undermining the market for custom tattoos.582 If clients who 
desire bespoke tattoos fear that their design will be subse-
quently tattooed on other clients, or perhaps even worse, that a 
design they thought was custom-designed was in fact a copy of 
a preexisting tattoo, they may well spend their money on a mo-
torcycle or some other symbol of youthful rebellion instead.583
 
 576. See id. with Subject 1 at 8–9 (describing what copying does to one’s 
ability to participate in the tattoo community and the benefit of being in such 
a community). 
 
Likewise, if clients worry that their tattooer will assert some 
control over their use of the tattoo, they will either insist on 
contractual guarantees against such interference, demand low-
er prices to offset this risk, or simply opt out of the tattoo mar-
 577. ELLICKSON, supra note 570, at 184. 
 578. Interview with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that money and a 
lack of enforcement are benefits to copying—“At the end of the day, [the copy-
ist] knows they can [copy]”). 
 579. See id. with Subject 7 at 58 (noting how “the old timers” made money 
through copying). 
 580. See id. at 61 (describing the “individual spirit” of tattooing). 
 581. Cf. id. with Subject 2 at 21–22 (noting that when a client purchases a 
tattoo, they have the right to display it). 
 582. Cf. id. with Subject 7 at 62 (discussing the fact that people who seek 
custom tattoos want an original design that will not be copied). 
 583. Cf. id. with Subject 13 at 142 (discussing the unspoken agreement be-
tween client and tattooer that the tattoo is original and will not be copied). 
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ket altogether.584 For the tattoo industry, the creation and en-
forcement of informal norms is a small price to pay for avoiding 
the erosion of client demand and the increase in transaction 
costs associated with defectors.585
Ellickson’s framework also helps explain why street shops 
are less likely to follow tattoo industry norms. To the extent 
street shop tattooers are part of the same community as custom 
tattooers, they are on its fringes. The social power custom 
tattooers wield over one another is less potent within the street 
shop community because it deemphasizes creativity and origi-
nality.
 
586 And because their clients are, as a rule, less interested 
in one-of-a-kind designs, street shop tattooers are insulated 
from erosion of the custom tattoo market that results from vio-
lations of the anti-copying norm.587 In other words, the norm 
against copying is not obviously welfare enhancing for street 
shop tattooers as a subgroup of the wide tattoo community.588 
However, given the nebulous distinction between street and 
custom tattooing and the mobility of individual tattooers along 
that professional spectrum, it would be easy to overstate the in-
centives for defection.589
Other non-IP norms within the tattoo industry confirm 
that collective self-interest motivates tattooers. Tattooers gen-
erally accept a number of self-imposed restrictions that are best 
understood as efforts to preserve the reputational and economic 




 584. Id. 
 For example, most tat-
too shops refuse to tattoo clients’ faces and—until recently—
hands because of the social stigma and economic consequences 
 585. This explanation is consistent with norms outside of the IP context 
that emerge when a group derives collective economic benefit from them. See, 
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bern-
stein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
 586. See generally Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 65–80 (dis-
cussing the tattoo industry from the perspective of a street shop tattooer). 
 587. Cf. id. at 66 (noting that a tattoo is a luxury item, and therefore, the 
client should get what they want). 
 588. Id. 
 589. See id. with Subject 2 at 24 (identifying the blurred line between cus-
tom tattooing and street shops). 
 590. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233. See also #electricalivia, TUMBLR 
(Sept. 26, 2013; 12:08 PM), http://electricalivia.tumblr.com/post/51739086191/ 
hand-neck-finger-face-tattoos.  
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still attached to highly visible tattoos.591 For similar reasons, 
most tattoo shops turn away customers seeking tattoos associ-
ated with gangs or hate groups.592 Those norms could be seen as 
expressions of tattooers’ own personal preferences.593 However, 
in the aggregate, they discourage short-term personal economic 
gains for the sake of the collective maintenance of industry-
wide market demand.594
2. Norms as Exclusionary Practices 
 But as described below, these same 
self-protective instincts sometimes translate into exclusionary 
anti-competitive practices. 
In some ways, the tattoo industry resembles an informal 
guild.595 It maintains trade secrets.596 It regulates entry into the 
profession.597 And relatedly, it excludes potential competitors in 
order to limit competition.598 These efforts offer a supplemental 
explanation for tattoo industry norms, particularly the norm 
against copying custom designs.599





 591. See Rubin, supra note 
 Tattooing requires a host of arcane technical knowledge 
19, at 233. See also #electricalivia, supra note 
590.  
 592. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 151. 
 593. See id. 
 594. Cf. id. with Subject 7 at 61 (observing that the aversion to copying in 
the tattoo community is connected to client desires for custom tattoos). 
 595. Id. 
 596. See ROBERT P. MERGES, FROM MEDIEVAL GUILDS TO OPEN SOURCE 
SOFTWARE: INFORMAL NORMS, APPROPRIABILITY INSTITUTIONS, AND INNOVA-
TION 5–7 (2004) (describing the role medieval guilds played in protecting trade 
secrets). 
 597. Id. (describing apprenticeship systems within guilds). 
 598. See Gary Richardson, Guilds, Laws, and Markets for Manufactured 
Merchandise in Late-Medieval England, in EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HIS-
TORY 41 (2004) 1, 1–2 (citing NORMAN CANTOR, MEDIEVAL READER 278 (1994) 
(noting that “‘craft guilds’  . . . main purpose and activity was narrow regula-
tion of industrial productivity in order to restrain competition”)); DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 134 (1981) (noting 
the “guilds organized to protect local artisans . . . [and preserve] local monopo-
lies against encroachment from outside competition”). 
 599. Norms of exclusion can be particularly powerful and attractive to a 
community. See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CON-
FLICT 107 (1995) (arguing that the most powerful norms benefit group mem-
bers at the expense of non-members). 
 600. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–34; SANDERS, supra note 72, at 70. 
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traditionally unavailable to the general public.601 Historically, 
tattooers built and repaired their own equipment and mixed 
their own pigments, to say nothing of the technique necessary 
to execute a passable tattoo without causing a client inordinate 
pain.602 Until very recently, this information was shrouded in 
mystery.603 As one tattooer described past generations of 
tattooers, “[T]hey were like magicians; they were able to hold 
onto those secrets of how to tattoo.”604 Another said of tattooing: 
“[I]t’s this old, magical art. It’s behind the curtain.”605
By guarding this information closely, tattooers were able to 
carefully limit entry into the trade.
 
606 For most of the history of 
tattooing in the United States, tattooers learned either through 
a time consuming process of trial and error, or, more commonly, 
through an apprenticeship with an established tattooer.607 
There were no tattoo schools, no how-to guides, no correspond-
ence courses, and no YouTube videos.608
Tattooers even withheld information from each other. One 
tattooer explained, “Tattoo artists would never share infor-
mation. They would tell you wrong information. Sailor Jerry 
was notorious for that. He’d hide little things in his drawings or 
leave little things out.”
 
609 As more skilled artists took up tattoo-
ing, anti-competitive concerns drove further efforts to maintain 
secrecy: “[The old timers] were afraid that if everybody knew 
that information, the quality level would go up so high, they 
couldn’t compete. Because they weren’t very good artists.”610
Tattoo equipment and supply distributors, eager to exploit 
the untapped market of aspiring tattooers, challenged this 
longstanding secrecy by marketing pre-assembled tattoo ma-




 601. See Rubin, supra note 
 
19, at 235 (explaining how tattooers not only 
use flash, but create custom designs from other cultures, understand how to 
properly outline and color tattoos, and practice safe sanitation techniques). 
 602. See id. at 233–34. 
 603. Id. at 234 (listing the books, newsletters, and conventions which now 
disseminate tattoo trade secrets). 
 604. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 59.  
 605. Id. with Subject 8 at 78. 
 606. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 234 (describing the “small nucleus” of se-
cretive independent leaders who controlled the industry). 
 607. SANDERS, supra note 72, at 70. 
 608. Id. 
 609. Interview with Subject 7,  supra note 8, at 59.  
 610. Id. 
 611. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 110. 
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Today, the widespread availability of information on the Inter-
net further disrupts the traditional control tattooers exerted of 
the secrets of their trade.612
[P]eople are being too open with stuff . . . [b]ecause there’s too many 
people . . . . [P]eople are too accepting [and] just let people into the in-
dustry . . . . There are way too many people in the industry now. It 
used to be tattooers were fucking rich . . . . [Y]ou did well for what you 
did, and it’s not like that anymore.
 Some tattooers expressed concern 
about the impact of this free flow of information: 
613
One way to understand the norm against copying is as an 
effort to reconstruct something akin to the entry barriers secre-
cy once provided. Custom tattooing involves two distinct skill 
sets. First, it requires technical skill—that is, a working under-
standing of how to translate a given design onto the client’s 
body.
 
614 A good tattooer must understand how to operate her 
machine, the choice between various needle configurations, and 
the unique characteristics of human skin, among other special-
ized knowledge. Second, custom tattooing requires the ability to 
conceive of and execute original designs.615 In addition to an 
understanding of composition, color theory, and a variety of ar-
tistic styles, custom design requires creativity, imagination, 
and time.616
Old school tattooers limited market entry by controlling ac-




Taken together, skepticism about the legal system, the col-
lective interest in satisfying client expectations, and the desire 
 Today’s tattooers, though they have largely lost con-
trol over those once valuable trade secrets, can rely on the se-
cond set of skills to regulate their trade. By emphasizing origi-
nal designs, in part through the anti-copying norm, custom 
tattooers have shaped the market in a way that reduces compe-
tition from street shop tattooers and new market entrants who 
may have technical skill but lack the talent or inclination to 
create one-of-a-kind designs for their clients. 
 
 612. See, e.g., Learn How to Tattoo Step by Step on Video!, LEARN HOW TO 
TATTOO (Sept. 17, 2013), http://learn-tattoo.com (advertising books, software, 
and videos teaching how to tattoo).  
 613. Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 94.   
 614. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235 (noting the “careful attention” 
tattooers demonstrate when working). 
 615. Id. 
 616. See id. at 235 (noting “outstanding artists usually charge by the 
hour”). 
 617. Id. 
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to limit competition within the trade explain why the tattoo in-
dustry relies on norms rather than formal intellectual property 
protection and why its norms reflect the particular set of obli-
gations described above. The next Part turns to the broader 
implications of tattoo industry norms for intellectual property 
law and policy. 
IV.  LESSONS FROM THE TATTOO INDUSTRY   
Because tattoo industry norms are largely a function of idi-
osyncratic cultural and market characteristics, we might expect 
them to resist generalizable insights. Outside of other commu-
nities or industries with deeply rooted antagonism toward the 
legal system, the cultural origins of tattoo industry norms tell 
us little about whether and how we should expect intellectual 
property norms to develop elsewhere. Nonetheless, two features 
of the tattoo market offer broadly applicable lessons. First, the 
tattoo industry’s client-driven incentive structure reinforces the 
notion that formal intellectual property protection imposes uni-
formity costs when it ignores the creative dynamics within par-
ticular communities. Second, the tattoo industry’s focus on the 
provision of personal services, rather than the multiplication 
and sale of copies, might serve as a useful model for other crea-
tive industries struggling with the ubiquity of copying. 
A. THE ROLE OF NON-LEGAL INCENTIVES 
Copyright and patent exclusivity exist to spur the creation 
of public goods that would go unproduced but for those legally 
constructed incentives because of the ready appropriability of 
their value by competitors.618 An ideally calibrated intellectual 
property system would provide just enough incentive to prompt 
the creation of new works.619
 
 618. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (“The foundation for 
the American patent system is purely economic.”); Perzanowski & Schultz, su-
pra note 
 Any incentives beyond the bare 
minimum impose unnecessary costs on the public in the form of 
209, at 2110 (explaining the economic incentive theory for copyright). 
 619. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing copyright should “give creators 
enough entitlements to induce them to produce the works from which we all 
benefit but no more”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, 
and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 
(2004) (suggesting patent protection should be conferred only to the “precise 
extent[] necessary to secure each individual innovation’s ex ante expected prof-
itability”). 
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higher prices, reduced availability, and restrictions on the use 
of creative works.620
Not all creators require the same incentives. Some face 
higher upfront costs or greater threats of appropriation.
 
621 And 
they create against different backdrops of non-legal and even 
non-pecuniary incentives.622 These conditions, and thus optimal 
incentives, vary from author to author, perhaps even from work 
to work.623 And they vary considerably from industry to indus-
try.624
But the rights intellectual property law confers are insen-
sitive to fluctuations in the incentives necessary to induce crea-
tive production.
  
625 Intellectual property protections are uniform. 
An author who will create only if promised a significant return 
on her opportunity costs receives the same level of copyright 
protection as one who creates purely out of a love for her 
craft.626 By creating and enforcing rights without regard to con-
text, intellectual property imposes uniformity costs through 
both over- and under-incentivizing innovation.627
 
 620. See generally Fred Anthony Rowley, Jr., Dynamic Copyright Law: Its 
Problems and a Possible Solution, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481, 487 (1998) (ex-
plaining the dangers of overbroad copyright protection, and even declaring 
that such protection leads to “legal constraints upon the ability of individuals 
to think about, discuss, and examine . . . ideas and facts”). 
 
 621. See Kieff, supra note 618, at 724–25 (describing the unique challenges 
of the biotechnology industry which faces incredibly high initial research and 
development costs). 
 622. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive 
Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2011) (arguing “[n]ew strains of 
thinking in the fields of economics, psychology, and business management 
studies now debunk the long-venerated” thought that people only create for 
economic incentives). 
 623. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 856 (2006) (describing how 
copyright law grants the same protection to any type of literary work, includ-
ing different types of software). 
 624. Id. at 857 (“Even when all creators within an industry or technological 
field face roughly the same type and magnitude of appropriability problem, the 
magnitude and type of problem will certainly vary among industries and tech-
nological fields.”). 
 625. See id. at 846–47 (describing the costs imposed by uniform intellectual 
property law given the variation in creative practices among industries); Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 
(2003) (noting the inefficiency of uniform patent law in light of differing costs 
of innovation across industries). 
 626. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 522–27 (2009) (discussing the roles 
of compulsion and love in the creative process). 
 627. See Carroll, supra note 623, at 847. 
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As Oliar and Sprigman point out in their study of standup 
comics, social norms highlight these uniformity costs and may 
provide limited relief from them.628 To the extent norms form 
part of the backdrop of existing non-legal incentives, they sug-
gest a more modest need for the additional legal incentives of 
intellectual property. Standup comedians produce new original 
material in the absence of meaningful copyright protection in 
part because community norms reward that behavior.629
There are two interrelated sources of non-legal incentives 
in the tattoo industry. First, and most directly, tattooers create 
new original designs because clients demand them.
 Be-
cause tattoo industry norms serve as an alternative to formal 
law rather than a substitute for it, they underscore the im-
portance of non-legal incentives even more dramatically. 
630 In order 
to attract clients willing to pay for their tattoo services, 
tattooers produce designs at no direct cost to the client.631
Where non-legal incentives—whether norm-based or mar-
ket-based—pervade a creative community, the risk of uniformi-
ty costs from over-protection is particularly high, and we 
should be particularly skeptical about the need for copyright 
protection. Even if tattooers were denied copyright altogether, 
these non-legal incentives suggest that their creative output 
would remain unchanged.  
 Tat-
too industry norms are partly an outgrowth of that market de-
mand for unique designs. But once those norms are established, 
they reinforce the existing market-based incentives with social 
ones.  
So while existing copyright doctrine surely protects tattoos, 
they would likely be excluded under a copyright regime more 
attuned to the realities of creative production.632 The tattoo in-
dustry is far from alone in this regard. Nor is it especially de-
serving of exclusion. State laws,633 local building codes,634
 
 628. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 
 pri-
12, at 1840–41. 
 629. Id. 
 630. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 145. 
 631. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235 (noting the initial consultation is 
“gratis”). 
 632. See Tattoo Art Inc. v. TAT Int’l LLC, 498 F. App’x 341 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (affirming copyright infringement of a tattoo). 
 633. See James Grimmelmann, Copyright, Technology, and Access to the 
Law: An Opinionated Primer (June 19, 2008), http://james.grimmelmann.net/ 
essays/CopyrightTechnologyAccess. 
 634. Id. 
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vate standards,635 publicly financed research,636 and perhaps 
even sure-fire blockbuster movies637
While tattoo industry norms highlight the problem of uni-
formity costs, they might also mitigate them. Among the costs 
of over-protection are the expense and strain on the judicial 
system associated with enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. But tattoo industry norms include a built-in safeguard 
against those costs: the meta-norm of rejecting reliance on for-
mal legal rights.
 are all susceptible to simi-
lar critiques. 
638
Tattooers, like standup comedians, chefs, and roller derby 
enthusiasts, should remind policymakers that incentives for 
creative production take many forms. An intellectual property 
policy structured around the expectations of a handful of pub-
lishers and distributors in a handful of industries that rose to 
prominence in the last century is one that neglects the prospect 
of new creative dynamics and markets in favor of inertia. And 
as the next section discusses, the tattoo industry—despite its 
status as one of humanity’s oldest forms of creativity—may of-
fer copyright-reliant industries hints at a new way forward. 
 So long as tattooers and other creative 
communities continue to resolve their disputes internally, they 
avoid imposing the shared public costs of adjudication and en-
forcement. In short, some of the risks of over-protection may 
dissipate if the members of a creative community consistently 
disclaim formal rights. 
B. CUSTOMIZATION & SERVICE 
Embedded in our copyright system are assumptions about 
the business models of creative industries. The copyright sys-
tem envisions a world in which rights holders produce copies of 
their works and distribute them to the public.639
 
 635. See Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. 
L. REV. 193 (2007).  
 But technology 
has made copying cheaper, easier, and faster, threatening the 
 636. See Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Re-
search: Necessary Incentive or Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
613 (2004). 
 637. See Mike Masnick, Does Batman Need Copyright Protection?, 
TECHDIRT (July 20, 2012, 8:24 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120 
719/18025319772/does-batman-need-copyright-protection.shtml. 
 638. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 234 (mentioning that leaders in the tattoo 
field solve their own legal problems and create requisite legal systems). 
 639. See Michael J. Madison, of Coase and Comics, or, the Comedy of Copy-
right, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 27, 34 (2009). 
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fundamental premise of this business model.640 Using a number 
of strategies, rights holders have responded with mixed results. 
They have waged war on intermediaries that enable or facili-
tate alleged infringement.641 They have targeted their own cus-
tomers in massive litigation dragnets.642 They have encumbered 
their products with digital rights management technologies 
that simultaneously decrease their value and alienate consum-
ers.643
Two facts about the tattoo industry separate it from most 
copyright-reliant industries. First, as discussed above, the con-
temporary tattoo industry emphasizes custom, one-of-a-kind 
designs rather than mass production.
 Because the tattoo industry relies on a very different 
strategy to extract value from its original works, it may offer 
some lessons for other creative industries seeking to wean 
themselves from over-reliance on control over the reproduction 
of copies. 
644 Second, tattooers do 
not sell products. As they see it, they are in a service profes-
sion. They sell an experience, perhaps even an attitude. Clients 
don’t pay for a drawing; they pay for the time the tattooer 
spends rendering that image on their skin. As one tattooer told 
me, “The image is just what happens to be left after you spend 
a moment in time with a particular person. It’s an intangible 
object.”645
I’m a cute, young, friendly girl. ’That is the difference . . . . [My co-
workers] are all grumpy old men. When people get tattooed by me, 
they’re paying for a whole experience. They’re like, “Oh, she’s really 
fun; she’s really sweet; she’s really cute; she’s upbeat; she’s silly. I’m 
going to get this fun, cute tattoo. It’s great.”
 A custom tattoo requires the client and tattooer to 
spend many hours in a physically—and occasionally emotional-
ly—intimate setting. As a result, clients look for interpersonal 




 640. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 
  
209, at 2068 (describing how 
technology instantaneously helps us infringe copyright, even unintentionally). 
 641. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913 (2005); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 
2007); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 642. See Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating 
P2P in the Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L. J. 565, 602–05 (2009). 
 643. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of 
the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BGM Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1157 (2007). 
 644. See Rubin, supra note 19. 
 645. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 64.  
 646. Id. with Subject 12 at 128. 
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Because tattooers provide value through client experience 
and service rather than the mere provision of copies, they re-
semble some other notable outliers in the world of intellectual 
property business models. Jambands, most notably the Grate-
ful Dead, earned their reputation and their fortune not through 
the sale of records, but through live performance.647 “The Grate-
ful Dead made each show a unique experience, presenting a 
unique set list and improvising heavily.”648
Tattooers also share something in common with companies 
that monetize open source software. Because the software itself 
is typically available at no charge, open source firms often de-
rive revenue not from selling copies, but by providing ancillary 
training and support services customized to meet the needs of 
each client.
 Much like custom 
tattooers, the value the Grateful Dead provided was a function 
of a customized experience largely immune from mass repro-
duction. 
649 Much like these open source firms, we could de-
scribe tattooers—who charge for their time but not their draw-
ings—as giving away the recipe but opening a restaurant that 
will execute it.650
This Article does not advocate that the music, film, and 
publishing industries jettison their current business models in 
favor of one patterned on the Grateful Dead or Sailor Jerry. 
But taking service and experience seriously could help copy-
right-reliant industries adapt to new market conditions.
 
651
Some more traditional copyright holders have already be-
gun to embrace the shift from distributing mass-produced cop-
ies to providing customized, personalized service. Former major 
label recording artist Mike Doughty recently began selling 




 647. See Schultz, supra note 
 
547, at 669. 
 648. Id. 
 649. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do 
Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34 (2006) (arguing that 
the “open source model leans ineluctably toward services firms”); Susan 
Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 834 
(2001) (noting that “[t]he purchaser. . . does not buy the actual product, which 
is available free of charge, but instead pays for . . . services”). 
 650. See Scafidi, supra note 649, at 832 (citing ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CA-
THEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCI-
DENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 165 (1999)).  
 651. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 548, 179–184 (2012) (noting 
the role experience and personal service play in limiting copying in food, mov-
ie, and music industries). 
 652. Mike Masnick, Musician Mike Doughty Offers Unique Copy of His 
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Each recording incorporates its date, location, and the full legal 
name of the purchaser.653 In addition, purchasers can choose 
between three keys for their recording, all for a mere $543.09 
per copy.654
Doughty’s experimental business model is at least in part 
an exercise in performance art. But other industries are em-
phasizing those aspects of their offerings that remain difficult 
to copy. The gaming industry’s focus on online multiplayer 
games can be viewed as an effort to entice consumers with ser-
vices and experiences that are far harder to duplicate than the 
mere contents of a disc.
  
655 Even the resurgence of 3D movies 
demonstrates Hollywood’s awareness of the need to offer cus-
tomers an experience that they cannot replicate at home.656
  CONCLUSION   
 
Tattooing, because it has always functioned primarily as a ser-
vice industry, and one that made the transition from mass pro-
duction to bespoke craftsmanship decades ago, illuminates one 
path forward for other creative industries frustrated by the ev-
er-decreasing value of the copy. 
The tattoo, though formally embraced by the copyright sys-
tem, fits rather awkwardly in any property regime. “Where 
classical economic theory recognizes three types of property: 
the intellectual, the real . . . and the movable . . . tattoo an-
nounces itself as a fourth type: a property that is at once mobile 
and inalienable.”657
 
New Song, Personalized to Each Buyer, for $543.09, TECHDIRT (Dec. 11, 2012, 
8:01 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/blog/casestudies/articles/20121207/1002382 
1309/musician-mike-doughty-offers-unique-copy-his-new-song-personalized-to 
-each-buyer-54309.shtml. 
 Although they are unlikely to express 
themselves in terms of property theory, tattooers see their work 
as a sui generis amalgam of art, commerce, and human tradi-
tion. Perhaps then, it is not entirely surprising that they have 
opted to regulate this unique form of expression with rules 
crafted and enforced within their community. 
 653. Id. 
 654. Id. 
 655. See generally Brandon Dixon, Does Every Game Have to Have Multi-
player?, EPICSLASH (May 1, 2012), http://www.epicslash.com/does-every-game 
-have-to-have-multiplayer (noting the ubiquity of online multiplayer games). 
 656. See generally Mike Cameo, The Comeback of the 3D Film: A New 
Trend for a New Decade of Films, YAHOO VOICES (Jan. 18, 2010), http://voices 
.yahoo.com/the-comeback-3d-film-trend-new-5287419.html (noting the resur-
gence of 3D theatrical releases). 
 657. Fleming, supra note 34, at 66–67. 
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The norms tattooers have developed serve a number of 
overlapping purposes. They protect both the relationship be-
tween tattooer and client and the underlying assertion of per-
sonal sovereignty the tattoo represents by guaranteeing client 
autonomy. They simultaneously preserve tradition by encour-
aging the use of flash designs and encourage innovation by pro-
tecting custom designs from copying. And they give tattooers 
valuable tools for cultivating market demand for their services 
and controlling competition within their trade. 
But the value of these norms is not confined to tattooers 
and their clients. They offer the rest of us something as well. 
They demonstrate that the assumptions upon which we base 
intellectual property law are empirically untested and myopi-
cally focused on a tiny sliver of overall creative production de-
fined by legacy business models. But the tattoo industry’s abil-
ity to withstand dramatic shifts in its means of creative 
production in recent decades suggests that other industries can 
successfully evolve to meet the changing demands of consum-
ers. And finally, the persistence of tattooing across cultures, 
continents, and millennia reminds us that the human need for 
creative production transcends the contingencies of markets 
and law. 
